The Horn of Africa’s strategic importance has long been a focal point of global competition, but the nature of that competition is undergoing a dramatic transformation. Recent events—particularly China’s burgeoning investments in port infrastructure, naval bases, and security cooperation—signal a fundamental shift, presenting a significant challenge to longstanding alliances and potentially destabilizing the region. This strategic realignment demands immediate scrutiny and a recalibration of Western policy.
The Horn of Africa, spanning Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan, sits at the crucial juncture of key shipping lanes, including the Suez Canal, and possesses considerable geopolitical value. Historically, the region has been dominated by Western powers—primarily the United States, seeking to maintain naval presence and combat terrorism, and European nations, prioritizing counter-piracy operations and humanitarian interventions. However, China’s arrival has dramatically altered this landscape, driven by its “Belt and Road” initiative and a calculated strategy to secure access to vital trade routes and enhance its global influence.
Over the past decade, China’s engagement has primarily focused on economic investment. In 2018, the Chinese-funded Port of Berbera in Somaliland—an autonomous region of Somalia—opened, offering a vital alternative to the established port of Mogadishu, which has historically been dominated by Western actors. This move, facilitated through a 30-year lease, was lauded by Somaliland’s government and provides China with a strategic foothold. “China’s investments are not driven by altruism,” explains Dr. Michael Mikewitz, a specialist in Sino-African relations at the University of Southern California. “It’s fundamentally about securing access and projecting power.” According to data from the Observatory of Chinese Investment, Chinese direct investment in Africa reached $83.6 billion in 2022, with a significant portion directed towards infrastructure projects across the Horn of Africa.
The expansion of the Djibouti International Free Trade City (DIFC), a massive development zone co-financed by China, further underscores this trend. While Djibouti benefits economically from the project—attracting foreign investment and creating jobs—it also provides China with a strategically located naval base, potentially allowing for greater military presence in the Red Sea. This base, completed in 2020, has raised concerns amongst Western intelligence agencies. “The establishment of a naval base in Djibouti, particularly one with China’s capabilities, represents a calculated move to counter U.S. dominance in the region,” asserts Professor Sarah Jackson, a geopolitical analyst at King’s College London. “It’s a classic example of great power competition playing out in real time.”
Recent developments in the region further complicate the situation. In July 2023, a report by the International Crisis Group highlighted increasing tensions between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan, fueled in part by competition for resources and regional influence. China has been a key mediator in several of these disputes, leveraging its economic leverage to exert diplomatic pressure. Moreover, the ongoing conflict in Sudan, with significant involvement of external actors, has provided China with opportunities to enhance its role as a mediator and supplier of military equipment—a move that directly challenges traditional Western patterns of engagement. Statistics from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicate a notable increase in Chinese arms exports to Sudan and Ethiopia over the past five years.
Looking ahead, the next six months will likely see continued expansion of Chinese infrastructure projects, including upgrades to existing ports and the development of new energy facilities. Furthermore, China’s influence in diplomatic efforts surrounding the Sudanese conflict is expected to grow. The long-term (5–10 years) impact is potentially far more disruptive. China’s sustained engagement—driven by economic and strategic imperatives—will likely lead to a gradual erosion of Western influence in the Horn of Africa. The region could become increasingly characterized by a multipolar dynamic, with China, Russia, and potentially other regional powers vying for influence. This shift could lead to a fragmentation of alliances and a significant increase in regional instability. Predicting the exact trajectory is difficult, but a key factor will be the willingness of Western powers to adapt their strategies and compete effectively. Without a coordinated and proactive approach, the Horn of Africa risks becoming a zone of intense geopolitical rivalry, with potentially devastating consequences. The challenge lies in recognizing this shift and proactively shaping the future of the region, rather than passively reacting to China’s increasingly dominant role. Analyzing the data from sources like the UN’s Integrated Maritime Security Information Centre demonstrates a continuous increase in Chinese naval presence in the region, reinforcing this dynamic.