The burgeoning strategic partnership between India and Italy represents a significant, yet complex, development within the evolving geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Recent high-level engagements, particularly the December 2025 visit by Italian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, underscore a deepening commitment to collaboration across multiple domains. This alignment, however, is not without its inherent challenges and potential pitfalls, demanding careful scrutiny and a nuanced understanding of the underlying motivations driving each nation’s approach.
The historical context of Italian foreign policy is crucial to understanding this dynamic. Following the end of the Cold War, Italy increasingly pursued a strategy of “enhanced multipolarity,” aimed at leveraging its influence within the European Union to shape global affairs. Traditionally, Rome has focused on promoting multilateralism and maintaining close ties with the United States, although this has been tempered by a desire for greater autonomy and a more assertive role in the Mediterranean region. Italy’s engagement with the Middle East, driven by historical ties and economic interests, has long been a defining feature of its foreign policy.
Recent developments, particularly the Joint Strategic Action Plan (JSAP) 2025-29, represent a tangible manifestation of this alignment. The JSAP, encompassing trade and economic cooperation, defense and security, counter-terrorism, space, science and technology, and renewable energy, demonstrates a shared vision for deepening bilateral relations. The focus on counter-terrorism, particularly in conjunction with India’s concerns regarding threats emanating from Pakistan and Afghanistan, is a key area of convergence. “We are seeing a very strategic alignment on the security front,” noted Dr. Elena Rossi, a senior fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali. “India’s concerns about regional security threats, coupled with Italy’s interests in the Mediterranean, create a powerful synergy.”
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC) is a cornerstone of this partnership. This ambitious infrastructure project, designed to connect India, the Middle East, and Europe, aims to enhance trade and investment flows while simultaneously bolstering security cooperation. The project’s potential, however, is contingent on navigating significant logistical and political hurdles, including securing transit agreements and addressing concerns regarding regional stability. The project’s expansion into the Red Sea region presents a particularly sensitive area, given ongoing geopolitical tensions and the vulnerability of maritime trade routes.
Italy’s evolving relationship with the European Union is another critical factor. While the EU’s policy towards India has generally been supportive, there are often diverging perspectives on issues such as trade, investment, and human rights. The recent summit discussions on the Ukraine conflict highlighted these differences, with Italy advocating for a diplomatic solution while India maintained a position of neutrality. “Italy’s strategic calculations are intrinsically linked to its EU membership,” argues Mr. Paolo Fabiani, Director of the Mediterranean Policy Institute. “Rome needs to balance its ambitions in the Indo-Pacific with the broader priorities of the EU, a dynamic that can sometimes create friction.”
The increasing naval presence of both nations in the Mediterranean Sea further underscores the strategic importance of this alliance. Italy’s longstanding maritime interests, combined with India’s growing naval capabilities and strategic concerns regarding maritime security, are fueling cooperation on issues such as maritime domain awareness, piracy deterrence, and the protection of critical infrastructure. The establishment of a Maritime Security Dialogue, currently under discussion, is a logical progression of this trend.
Looking ahead, the Indo-Italian strategic alignment appears poised for continued growth over the next six months. The focus will likely be on advancing the JSAP, securing the necessary approvals for the IMEEC, and solidifying the Maritime Security Dialogue. However, significant challenges remain. The potential for disagreements within the EU regarding broader geopolitical issues, coupled with the inherent complexities of the IMEEC, could create strain. Furthermore, India’s strategic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific – particularly its relationships with Australia, Japan, and Vietnam – may lead to indirect competition with Italy’s Mediterranean-centric approach.
Over the longer term, the alignment could become even more pronounced, particularly if the global security environment deteriorates. A sustained period of heightened geopolitical instability, characterized by increased tensions in the Indo-Pacific or a prolonged conflict in Ukraine, could accelerate the convergence of interests between Rome and New Delhi. However, sustaining this alignment requires ongoing dialogue, a commitment to shared values (even if interpreted differently), and a willingness to compromise. The ultimate test of this Indo-Italian Strategic Alignment will be its ability to adapt to the inevitable shifts in the global power dynamic and to translate its strategic objectives into tangible results—a truly powerful demonstration of enduring partnership.