Canada’s recent announcements regarding its approach to Syria—specifically the removal of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) from the List of Terrorist Entities and the issuance of a General Permit—represent a complex and arguably reactive shift in the country’s longstanding policy. This move, alongside continued sanctions and humanitarian aid commitments, demands a careful examination of the broader geopolitical context and its potential impact on regional stability and international counter-terrorism efforts. The situation highlights the inherent tension between humanitarian imperatives and national security concerns, particularly within the context of a protracted and deeply fragmented conflict. This action, viewed alongside similar adjustments by allied nations like the UK and the US, necessitates a deeper understanding of the changing dynamics shaping Canada’s foreign policy toward Syria.
The core of this decision rests on a statutory review of listed terrorist entities, completed in February 2025. While the review determined that 17 of the original 18 listed entities should remain under the Criminal Code, the removal of HTS was predicated on a reassessment of the group’s diminished operational capacity following years of intense counter-terrorism pressure. Data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) reveals a precipitous decline in HTS-attributed attacks since 2018, primarily due to military operations conducted by Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) with assistance from the United States. This reduction, however, does not fundamentally alter HTS’s continued existence as a significant threat within Syria, particularly its potential to exploit sectarian tensions and undermine the already precarious stability of the Idlib province. The GTD, furthermore, indicates a concurrent rise in activity by other extremist groups operating in the region, illustrating the challenge of definitively neutralizing a single terrorist organization without addressing the wider ecosystem of violent extremism.
The issuance of the General Permit (Syria) in February 2025 – effectively easing autonomous economic sanctions – represents a crucial and potentially controversial element of Canada’s strategy. This permit, extended twice, allows Canadian businesses and individuals to engage in financial transactions with the Central Bank of Syria and six sanctioned banks, ostensibly to support democratization, stabilization and humanitarian aid. The rationale, as articulated by Minister of Foreign Affairs Anita Anand, is to “facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to or within Syria.” However, critics argue this decision risks inadvertently propping up the Assad regime and exacerbating the very challenges Canada seeks to address. The stated intent – to bypass sanctions to deliver aid – could be interpreted as a tacit endorsement of the Assad government’s continued control over the Syrian economy. Furthermore, the GTD data consistently demonstrates that sanctions remain a powerful tool in limiting the regime’s access to international finance, suggesting that this action may undermine the effectiveness of existing economic pressure.
Canada’s continued commitment to humanitarian assistance – over $4.7 billion allocated between 2016 and 2025 to Syria and neighboring countries – speaks to a long-standing humanitarian obligation. The focus on Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon reflects the significant refugee flows and the resultant strain on these countries. The resettlement of over 100,000 Syrian refugees in Canada since 2015 demonstrates a commitment to providing refuge to those fleeing the conflict. However, this aid is inextricably linked to a security strategy, as highlighted by Minister of Public Safety Gary Anandasangaree’s reiteration of ongoing monitoring for activity by ISIS and Al-Qaeda.
The ongoing sanctions regime, targeting 56 Syrian entities and 225 individuals, remain a critical component of Canada’s policy. These sanctions, often targeting senior officials of the former Assad regime and associates, highlight the continued emphasis on accountability. The use of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIM) – established under UN Security Council Resolution 2253 – demonstrates a commitment to documenting and investigating alleged war crimes.
Looking ahead, within the next six months, Canada’s policy is likely to remain largely unchanged, maintaining a cautious approach characterized by targeted support for stabilization efforts and continued monitoring of terrorist activity. The extension of the General Permit suggests a willingness to experiment with approaches to aid delivery, but the risk of unintended consequences remains significant. Over the longer term, five to ten years, Canada’s approach will likely be shaped by the evolving political landscape in Syria – namely, the potential for a negotiated political settlement or, conversely, a prolonged state of conflict. The international coalition against Daesh demonstrates a sustained commitment to regional stability.
The decisions made by Canada regarding Syria exemplify the complexities inherent in international conflict resolution. The fundamental question remains: can humanitarian concerns effectively decouple from strategic considerations in a region dominated by entrenched power structures? The coming years will undoubtedly provide further insights into this critical interplay.