The death of Patriarch Filaret on March 20 has drawn fresh attention to the deep schism in Ukrainian Orthodoxy, a religious divide that remains entangled with the broader geopolitical contest between Russia and the West.
Filaret, who was 97, played a central role in the push for an independent Ukrainian church. His passing comes amid ongoing tensions between the Moscow-linked Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) and the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which was granted self-governance by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople in 2018.
The 2018 decision, strongly opposed by the Moscow Patriarchate, was welcomed by Kyiv as a step toward religious and national independence. It remains a flashpoint in Ukraine’s efforts to reduce Russian influence in all spheres of society.
Background and stakes
For decades, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church operated under the Moscow Patriarchate and was viewed by many as an instrument of Russian soft power. The creation of the OCU in 2019 aimed to sever that historical link. The UOC, led by Metropolitan Onufriy, has distanced itself from Moscow since Russia’s full-scale invasion but has not formally broken canonical ties, leading to continued friction with Ukrainian authorities.
The Ukrainian government, under President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, has supported the OCU as a symbol of national unity. Legislation adopted in 2024 requires religious organisations with ties to the Russian Orthodox Church to sever those links or face restrictions. Court cases and local decisions have targeted UOC communities accused of maintaining such connections.
Current landscape
Recent polling shows the OCU remains the largest Orthodox jurisdiction in Ukraine. According to a October 2024 survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), 70% of Ukrainians identify as Orthodox, with 56% affiliating with the OCU and only 6% with the UOC (Moscow Patriarchate). A portion describe themselves as “simply Orthodox” without specifying a jurisdiction.
The religious divide reflects wider societal cleavages over identity, language and geopolitical orientation. The OCU draws stronger support in western and central Ukraine and among younger urban populations, while the UOC retains a following in some rural and eastern areas.
International dimension
Russia has repeatedly criticised Ukraine’s policies toward the UOC as persecution of canonical Orthodoxy. Ukrainian officials maintain the measures are security-related and not directed at religious belief itself.
The schism has also strained relations within global Orthodoxy. The Moscow Patriarchate severed ties with Constantinople over the 2018 tomos and continues to regard the OCU as uncanonical.
Analysts see the church dispute as one element in the wider contest for influence in Ukraine and the Black Sea region. While religion is not the primary driver of the conflict, it remains a potent symbol of competing narratives of history and sovereignty.
Outlook
In the short term, Filaret’s death is unlikely to heal the divide. The UOC and OCU continue to operate in parallel, with occasional local disputes over property and parishes.
Longer term, the future of Ukrainian Orthodoxy will depend on the trajectory of the wider war, Ukraine’s European integration path, and whether the two churches can find any form of coexistence or eventual reconciliation — an outcome that currently appears distant.