The escalating conflict in Sudan, marked by brutal violence and widespread displacement, is increasingly revealing a complex web of external influence, with Iran’s involvement proving a particularly destabilizing factor. Recent sanctions, levied by the United States against Gebreil Ibrahim Mohamed Fediel (Gebreil) and the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade (BBMB), represent a significant step in attempting to curtail this influence, though the deeper strategic motivations remain obscured by layers of political maneuvering and armed struggle. The situation underscores a worrying trend of regional proxy conflicts, fueled by geopolitical competition and the vulnerability of states undergoing transitions. The fight for Sudan is, fundamentally, a struggle for regional dominance, and Iran’s active support for certain factions is intensifying the risks of a protracted and devastating war.
The immediate trigger for the current conflict – the April 2023 power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) – was already rooted in a protracted dispute over military authority and control of resources. However, the integration of Iranian support into the equation has dramatically altered the dynamics. Data from the International Crisis Group indicates that by late 2023, the BBMB, a largely unaccountable Islamist militia, was receiving direct technical assistance from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. This included training, communications equipment, and, according to intelligence assessments, specialized weaponry – reportedly small arms and tactical communications systems – designed to bolster the BBMB’s fighting capabilities.
Historically, Sudanese Islamist groups have been a persistent destabilizing force. During the thirty-year rule of Omar al-Bashir’s National Congress Party, these elements were instrumental in maintaining power through a combination of military force, patronage networks, and the imposition of a strict interpretation of Islamic law. While Bashir’s ouster in 2019 initially offered a window of opportunity for democratic reform, the rapid succession of interim governments and the failure to implement a fully inclusive political agreement left a power vacuum that extremist groups, including those bolstered by Iranian support, were quick to exploit. As Dr. Amina Khalil, Senior Analyst at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, notes, “The pre-2019 environment created a fertile ground for extremist groups, allowing them to operate with impunity and slowly regain influence through various channels, including exploiting local grievances and offering alternative governance models.”
The BBMB’s connection to Iran extends beyond mere material support. The group’s ideology – a hardline interpretation of Sunni Islam prioritizing a puritanical state and challenging the legitimacy of the transitional government – aligns closely with elements within the IRGC’s broader regional strategy. Iran seeks to establish a counterweight to Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s influence in the Horn of Africa and to cultivate allies willing to challenge Western-backed governments. Sudan, strategically positioned along the Red Sea and with significant natural resources, has become a key node in this effort. Furthermore, the BBMB’s recruitment activities have targeted marginalized communities, particularly within Darfur, offering financial incentives and a narrative of resistance against Western and regional influence.
Sanctions, as implemented by the U.S. Treasury Department, are a blunt instrument, but they represent a critical step in disrupting this flow of support. Executive Order 14098, authorizing sanctions against those “responsible for, or complicit in, or have directly or indirectly engaged or attempted to engage in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Sudan,” attempts to target individuals and organizations directly involved in facilitating Iranian influence. However, the effectiveness of these measures is hampered by the opacity surrounding the BBMB’s funding sources and operational networks. Intelligence estimates suggest that the group relies on a complex web of financiers, including diaspora communities in the Gulf region, to move and manage its resources.
Looking forward, the situation in Sudan presents a bleak short-term outlook. Within the next six months, the conflict is likely to intensify, with both the SAF and the RSF seeking to consolidate control over territory and resources. The BBMB, emboldened by Iranian support, will continue to pose a significant threat to the stability of the country. Furthermore, the risk of further regional escalation remains high, as neighboring countries – notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia – are increasingly involved in the conflict, either directly or through proxies. The United Nations estimates that over 7 million people, nearly a third of Sudan’s population, have been internally displaced, creating a massive humanitarian crisis.
In the longer term, beyond the next 10 years, the implications of Iranian influence in Sudan are deeply concerning. The potential for a protracted civil war, coupled with the country’s strategic importance, could further destabilize the entire Horn of Africa region. The rise of a fragmented, authoritarian state, heavily influenced by external actors, would present a breeding ground for terrorism and transnational crime. The United States, along with its allies, faces a considerable challenge in preventing a complete collapse of Sudan and mitigating the long-term consequences of this increasingly complex conflict. The key, moving forward, is a coordinated approach that combines targeted sanctions with diplomatic efforts to engage regional partners and promote a sustainable political solution. A failure to do so risks turning Sudan into a permanent zone of instability, with dire consequences for the region and beyond.