The specter of nuclear arms reduction, once a cornerstone of Cold War diplomacy, resurfaces with increasing urgency. Recent developments in the Indo-Pacific region, coupled with renewed tensions surrounding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, are forcing a critical reassessment of strategic stability and the enduring legacy of agreements like the START I treaty, formally released today by the Department of State. This volume of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991, offers a crucial window into the complex negotiations that shaped the end of the Cold War, revealing both the successes and the lingering complexities of achieving verifiable arms control. The document underscores that the pursuit of strategic stability is not a static process, but rather one characterized by continuous adaptation, emerging threats, and potentially, profoundly unfinished business. This analysis focuses on the immediate implications of the newly released materials, and forecasts potential future trends regarding international security.
The “START I” treaty, signed in July 1991, represented a landmark achievement, limiting strategic offensive arms to 1,600 and 2,600 deployed nuclear warheads respectively. However, as highlighted in the volume, the treaty’s completion was far from assured. The period covered – the closing months of the Soviet Union – was characterized by immense volatility, marked by rapid political shifts and escalating geopolitical risks. The negotiations were inextricably linked to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the unraveling of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, and the growing threat of a potential Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, issues that simultaneously dominated U.S. foreign policy. The volume’s meticulous documentation reveals the urgency with which the Bush administration, under Secretary of State James Baker, engaged in “endgame” diplomacy, spurred by President Bush’s planned trip to Moscow in the summer of 1991. “We were chasing shadows,” notes Dr. Evelyn Sharpe, a specialist in Soviet-American relations at the Brookings Institution, “The collapse of the USSR created a power vacuum filled by competing strategic interests, pushing the limits of the treaty’s provisions.”
The primary motivations driving the negotiations were multifaceted. The United States sought to demonstrate its commitment to arms control, bolster its international standing, and establish a framework for further reductions. Simultaneously, the administration aimed to prevent a destabilizing proliferation of nuclear weapons and to ensure U.S. security against potential threats, including a resurgent Soviet Union and the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iraq. Soviet motivations, driven by Gorbachev’s “glasnost” and “perestroika” policies, centered on economic reform and reducing the burden of military spending. However, the inherent tensions between these objectives – the US drive for verifiable reductions and the Soviet Union’s need for conventional military strength – consistently threatened to derail the process. The volume demonstrates the intense debates surrounding land-based mobile missiles, a key sticking point in the “START II” negotiations that followed, and the equally contentious issues of air-launched cruise missiles, which the Soviets initially refused to dismantle despite U.S. pressure. "The ALCM debate reveals the fundamental asymmetry in the strategic calculation,” argues Dr. Robert Jenkins, a scholar of strategic foresight at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “The Soviets were acutely aware of the potential for ALCMs to bypass Soviet defenses, while the U.S. viewed them as a critical vulnerability.”
Recent developments reinforce the relevance of these historical dynamics. The ongoing tensions between Russia and NATO, fueled by the war in Ukraine and the deployment of advanced weaponry in Eastern Europe, have reignited concerns about a new arms race. The rise of China as a major nuclear power further complicates the strategic landscape, demanding a renewed commitment to arms control and verification. Moreover, the erosion of international norms surrounding arms control – evidenced by Russia’s blatant disregard for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty – underscores the fragility of such agreements. “The situation highlights a critical truth: treaties are only as strong as the political will to uphold them,” says Dr. Sharpe. “Without a robust framework of verification and enforcement, arms control agreements risk becoming irrelevant.”
Looking ahead, the short-term (next 6 months) outlook involves continued instability, punctuated by incremental diplomatic efforts to manage the risks. We can anticipate further escalation of tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, fueled by competition for influence and control of strategic resources. The United States and its allies will likely seek to strengthen their alliances and deter further aggression. The next 6-12 months will also be critical for assessing the viability of renewed dialogue with Russia, although this is highly dependent on the evolving nature of the conflict in Ukraine. The long-term (5-10 years) prospects are more uncertain. A significant shift in the geopolitical landscape—such as a collapse of the Russian economy or a dramatic change in U.S. foreign policy—could open the door for renewed arms control negotiations. However, without a fundamental shift in strategic thinking, the probability of a new arms race remains elevated. The volume’s documentation serves as a stark reminder that the pursuit of strategic stability is an ongoing struggle, requiring constant vigilance, innovation, and a willingness to engage in difficult conversations. It’s a legacy of START I, a testament to both the transformative potential of diplomacy and the enduring challenges of safeguarding global security.