The Sahel, a vast swathe of land stretching across five countries – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Mauritania – has been grappling with a protracted humanitarian crisis exacerbated by climate change, desertification, and, crucially, the expansion of jihadist groups like Boko Haram and groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Decades of weak governance, coupled with rising ethnic tensions and economic hardship, have created fertile ground for instability, culminating in military coups in Mali and Niger in recent years. This backdrop significantly impacts the FCDO’s ability to deliver aid effectively, adding layers of complexity to an already challenging operational environment.
Historical Context: A Long-Standing Engagement
The UK’s involvement in the Sahel dates back decades, rooted initially in post-colonial development assistance and later increasingly focused on counterterrorism. The establishment of the Department for International Development (DfID) in 2001 formalized this commitment. Throughout the early 21st century, the UK provided substantial support for governance reforms, security sector strengthening, and agricultural development – often in partnership with the European Union. The 2013 intervention in Mali, following a military coup and the rapid advance of extremist forces, underscored the strategic importance of the region and solidified the UK’s security role alongside humanitarian assistance. However, the subsequent instability and the rise of groups like the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) exposed limitations in these approaches.
Key Stakeholders & Motivations
The landscape of actors involved in the Sahel is incredibly complex. Beyond the FCDO, key stakeholders include: the European Union, with its Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI); the United Nations, particularly through its peacekeeping missions and humanitarian agencies; regional organizations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); and the aforementioned Sahelian states themselves, each grappling with varying degrees of internal conflict and external influence. The motivations of these actors are often divergent. The EU’s priorities frequently center on promoting stability for migration control, while the UN’s approach is predominantly driven by humanitarian imperatives. The FCDO’s focus, while rooted in humanitarian concerns, is undeniably interwoven with counterterrorism objectives and the desire to maintain influence in a strategically vital region. As Dr. Alistair Munro, Senior Fellow at the International Crisis Group, notes, “The humanitarian space in the Sahel has become a proxy battleground for geopolitical competition, making effective aid delivery increasingly difficult.”
Recent Developments (Past Six Months)
Over the past six months, the situation has been characterized by a dramatic shift. The coups in Mali and Niger created a security vacuum, enabling extremist groups to consolidate their gains and launch increasingly sophisticated attacks. Simultaneously, relations between the FCDO and the governments of Mali and Niger have deteriorated sharply due to concerns over human rights abuses and the governments’ prioritization of ties with Russia and the Wagner Group. This has led to the suspension of significant aid programs and a scramble by the FCDO to redirect assistance to alternative partners, primarily Chad and Burkina Faso – although the latter faces significant operational challenges due to the ongoing conflict. Data from the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) reveals a noticeable decline in FCDO aid disbursements to Mali and Niger since the coups, while investments in Chad and Burkina Faso have seen a corresponding increase.
Strategic Implications & Outlook
The FCDO’s evolving approach in the Sahel presents several potential short-term outcomes. Within the next six months, we can anticipate continued instability, further displacement of populations, and a persistent humanitarian crisis. The FCDO will likely remain focused on supporting Chad and Burkina Faso, but its capacity to effectively address the broader needs of the region will be constrained by the ongoing political turmoil and security challenges. Longer term (5-10 years), the situation could either stabilize, with the emergence of more resilient governance structures and a reduction in extremist influence, or it could deteriorate further, leading to a protracted state of conflict and humanitarian catastrophe. “The fundamental challenge,” argues Professor Isabelle Dupont, specialist in African Security at Sciences Po, “is that the Sahel’s problems are not solely humanitarian; they are intrinsically linked to governance failures and unresolved geopolitical tensions. Simply throwing aid at the symptom – the humanitarian crisis – won’t solve the underlying disease.”
Looking ahead, a more nuanced and strategic approach is needed. This requires moving beyond short-term, reactive interventions and investing in long-term development programs that address the root causes of instability, such as poverty, inequality, and lack of access to education and healthcare. Furthermore, strengthening regional cooperation and supporting the development of robust governance structures are crucial. The FCDO must also acknowledge the strategic implications of its engagement and work collaboratively with allies to address the security challenges posed by extremist groups. A crucial element will be fostering greater transparency and accountability within aid distribution, aligning with the principles of the IATI framework.
The shifting sands of influence in the Sahel demand a critical assessment of the FCDO’s role and a renewed commitment to a sustainable and effective approach. The coming months will undoubtedly reveal whether the UK’s efforts can contribute to a more stable and prosperous future for the region, or if it will continue to grapple with the immense complexity of a crisis driven by decades of unresolved challenges. We must examine how effectively this aid is actually reaching those who need it most and whether its strategic goals align with genuine humanitarian outcomes.