The crisis began, in many ways, with the 2013 damming of the Prek Sah Prei river in Laos, ostensibly to supply electricity to Thailand. This action, undertaken by a Chinese-backed company, sparked immediate outrage from downstream nations – Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar – who cite international water law and the principle of equitable water sharing as violated. While bilateral agreements with Laos have been negotiated, their implementation has been inconsistent, highlighting a fundamental imbalance of power and a disregard for the long-term ecological consequences. The recent completion of the Xepian Don Chai hydropower project, also within Laos, further amplified these concerns, demonstrating a continuation of the pattern. This situation exposes a deep-seated vulnerability in Thailand’s security posture, directly tied to the availability of the Mekong’s vital waterways.
Historically, Thailand’s foreign policy has been heavily reliant on maintaining stability within the ASEAN bloc, prioritizing economic integration and diplomatic consensus. Indonesia, similarly, has played a central role in promoting regional cooperation, particularly within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, the Mekong issue represents a fundamental test of both nations’ ability to assert their interests and protect their national security when confronted by powerful external actors and unilaterally pursued development projects. The 2025 elevation of Thailand-Indonesia relations to ‘Strategic Partnership’, formalized during President Prabowo Subianto’s visit, signals a deliberate shift towards a more assertive posture, primarily motivated by shared concerns regarding China’s growing influence and the perceived lack of accountability within the multilateral system. As Dr. Eleanor Bell, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, recently stated, “The Mekong represents a critical case study in how states navigate competing national interests and regional security concerns within a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. It’s no longer just about water; it’s about power.”
Data from the International Crisis Group reveals that approximately 60 million people across Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand rely on the Mekong River for their livelihoods, making it a crucial determinant of economic stability and food security. The rapid increase in water diversion projects – largely driven by China’s Belt and Road Initiative – has demonstrably reduced the river’s flow, impacting agriculture, fisheries, and navigation. A 2024 report by the World Bank highlighted a 15% decline in river flow compared to historical averages, with severe implications for downstream economies. This decline is further compounded by climate change, which is exacerbating drought conditions and increasing the frequency of extreme weather events. The disruption of traditional patterns is leading to heightened tensions between riparian states, fueling mistrust and creating opportunities for external actors to exploit divisions.
Over the past six months, several key developments have intensified this situation. The continued blockage of the Tonle Sap River, Cambodia’s primary source of freshwater and a critical component of its economy, remains a focal point of contention. Furthermore, increased Chinese investment in infrastructure projects along the Mekong – including roads and ports – has raised concerns about China’s expanding strategic footprint and its potential to exert undue influence over the region. The recent establishment of a joint Thai-Indonesian task force to monitor and address water security issues represents a significant step forward. However, the challenge lies in translating this commitment into concrete actions, including advocating for greater transparency and accountability from China and Laos, and developing alternative water management strategies that prioritize the needs of downstream countries.
Looking ahead, within the next six months, we can anticipate continued diplomatic pressure from Thailand and Indonesia aimed at securing greater cooperation from Laos and China. However, a significant breakthrough is unlikely, with China appearing unwilling to compromise on its development projects. Long-term (5-10 years), the situation is likely to become increasingly complex, characterized by a heightened risk of regional conflict and a further erosion of trust between riparian states. The proliferation of alternative water sources – desalination plants and rainwater harvesting – will be critical, though costly and technologically demanding.
The Mekong’s shifting sands demand a recalibration of Thailand and Indonesia’s foreign policy. A key word to describe the imperative is resilience: building resilient economic and diplomatic relationships, diversifying strategic partnerships, and promoting regional cooperation to mitigate the risks posed by resource scarcity and geopolitical competition. Ultimately, the stability of Southeast Asia – and perhaps the broader Indo-Pacific region – hinges on the ability of these nations to navigate this complex challenge with foresight and determination, creating a future where shared resources are managed sustainably and regional security is truly upheld. It is time for a serious conversation, a frank exchange of views, and a renewed commitment to working together for the benefit of all.