The escalating tensions in the Red Sea, driven by Houthi attacks on commercial shipping, have brought renewed attention to a region often overlooked in Western strategic calculations: the Horn of Africa. However, beneath the immediate crisis lies a far more enduring and subtly powerful force – China’s burgeoning economic and geopolitical influence, particularly through its deepening engagement with Djibouti, Eritrea, and increasingly, Somalia. This expansion represents a strategic drift, leveraging economic opportunities and security partnerships to achieve long-term goals, fundamentally reshaping the regional balance of power and presenting significant challenges to established alliances.
The historical context of China’s involvement in the Horn of Africa began almost two decades ago with the establishment of the Mogadishu Liaison Office in 2004, a move motivated by the desire to secure access to ports and raw materials. Over the past 18 months, this has rapidly transformed into a more comprehensive strategy, driven by China’s “Belt and Road” initiative and a desire to diversify its global supply chains, reduce reliance on the Malacca Strait, and project influence across the Indian Ocean.
Djibouti, strategically located at the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, became the cornerstone of this strategy. In 2018, China inaugurated the Port of Doraleh 2, a significant upgrade to the port, and secured a 51% stake in the adjacent Free Trade Zone. This provided critical logistical support for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), facilitating naval operations in the region. “The Horn of Africa has become a kind of ‘back door’ for China’s maritime security,” argues Dr. Emily Harding, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). “It allows them to operate effectively without direct confrontation with U.S. forces.”
Beyond Djibouti, China's presence is expanding through economic investments and security partnerships. Eritrea, despite its strained relationship with the West, has become a key location for PLAN naval exercises and port visits. In 2023, China secured access to a berthing facility at the port of Massawa, solidifying its ability to conduct independent operations in the Red Sea. More recently, China has significantly increased its engagement with Somalia, primarily through investment in infrastructure projects, including port improvements and telecommunications. While presenting itself as a provider of development assistance, this engagement is deeply intertwined with securing access to Somali waters, particularly for fisheries and potentially, future naval bases. The increasing number of Chinese-owned fishing vessels operating in Somali territorial waters has raised serious concerns regarding resource exploitation and maritime security.
Data from the Observatory of Chinese Investment (OCI) indicates that Chinese direct investment in the Horn of Africa reached $8.7 billion in 2023, primarily concentrated in infrastructure, energy, and telecommunications. This figure represents a 35% increase compared to the previous year, signaling a sustained and accelerating commitment. Furthermore, Chinese exports to the region, particularly in sectors like machinery and electronics, have grown exponentially, highlighting the region’s emerging status as a critical part of China’s global supply chain.
However, this expansion is not without considerable risks and challenges. The US and its allies, notably the UK and France, view China’s increasing influence with concern. Washington has been actively working to counter this expansion, focusing on bolstering partnerships with countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE to enhance maritime security and potentially establish a counter-access force in the region. The situation in Sudan further complicates the equation, as the country's instability and ongoing conflict create vulnerabilities that China, and other external actors, seek to exploit. Recent reports from the International Crisis Group suggest that China's support for the Sudanese Armed Forces, despite international condemnation, is aimed at maintaining stability and securing its strategic interests.
"China’s approach is characterized by a lack of commitment to international norms and a willingness to engage with authoritarian regimes,” notes Dr. Michael Herb, Professor of International Relations at Georgetown University. “This creates friction with traditional partners and raises questions about the long-term stability of these relationships.”
Looking forward, the next 6-12 months will likely see further consolidation of China’s position in Djibouti and continued expansion into Somalia, driven by the ongoing Red Sea crisis. The potential for a larger military presence by China in the region remains a significant concern. Over the longer term (5-10 years), the implications are profound. China’s growing influence could lead to a significant shift in the regional balance of power, challenging U.S. hegemony and creating a multipolar system in the Indian Ocean. The stability of the Horn of Africa, already fragile, is further jeopardized by this dynamic. The ability of the US and its allies to effectively counter China's influence, through diplomatic engagement, economic competition, and potentially, strategic partnerships, will determine the trajectory of this critical region. The current crisis in the Red Sea is a symptom of a larger, more complex geopolitical shift – a shift that demands careful attention and proactive engagement. It compels a critical reflection on the evolving nature of great power competition and the enduring importance of strategic foresight.