The Indian Ocean’s strategic importance is increasingly defined by a complex web of geopolitical tensions, maritime security challenges, and the ambitions of regional powers. The 7th National Security Adviser level meeting of the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC), held in New Delhi in November 2025, offers a critical window into this dynamic. This gathering, a product of a 2024 framework, reveals not only the ongoing efforts to address shared security concerns but also the potential for the CSC to become a more prominent, and perhaps contested, player in the region. The meeting’s outcomes and the underlying motivations of the participating nations—Maldives, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Seychelles (observer), and Malaysia (guest)—point towards a significant, albeit uncertain, evolution in regional security architecture.
The Colombo Security Conclave, established in 2024, represents India’s effort to foster stability and cooperation within the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). It’s rooted in the recognition that many of the challenges—piracy, terrorism, organized crime, and resource competition—transcend national borders, demanding a coordinated response. The Conclave’s five pillars – Maritime Safety and Security, Countering Terrorism and Radicalization, Combating Trafficking and Transnational Organized Crime, Cyber Security and Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Technology, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief – reflect a broad approach designed to tackle these multifaceted issues. The first Secretary General’s presentation highlighted a sustained effort to implement decisions from the 6th NSA level meeting, including operationalizing joint maritime patrols and intelligence sharing initiatives. According to Dr. Shreya Verma, a senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation specializing in IOR security, “The CSC’s value lies in its ability to create a platform for dialogue and action, something many nations in the region struggle to achieve on their own.”
However, the CSC’s trajectory is heavily influenced by the evolving strategic calculations of its member states. Maldives, facing persistent threats from extremist groups and increasingly reliant on India for security assistance, is a key driver of the Conclave’s activities. Recent reports indicate heightened Chinese naval activity in the Maldives’ exclusive economic zone, raising concerns about Beijing’s expanding influence. The Maldives’ participation is fundamentally about securing its sovereignty and protecting its vital shipping lanes. Sri Lanka, grappling with internal political instability and economic challenges, sees the CSC as a means to access technical expertise and financial support, while also seeking to bolster its naval capabilities. Bangladesh, facing similar pressures related to maritime security and transnational crime, is focused on leveraging the Conclave for training and capacity building, particularly in areas like counter-piracy and border security.
Mauritius, a strategically located island nation, brings a focus on combating transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking and human smuggling, utilizing the CSC as a mechanism to strengthen regional law enforcement cooperation. The inclusion of Malaysia as a guest reflects its growing interest in the IOR, driven by concerns about maritime security and its strategic location, particularly the Malacca Strait. According to Mr. Kenji Tanaka, a specialist in Southeast Asian security at the Institute for Strategic Studies, “Malaysia’s participation underscores the broader trend of ASEAN nations recognizing the need for a more proactive role in addressing maritime security challenges within the IOR.”
The recent accession of the Republic of Seychelles as a full member represents a particularly significant development. This move signals a recognition of Seychelles' strategic importance as a key transit route for vessels and a potential flashpoint for geopolitical competition. Furthermore, the Conclave’s engagement with Cyber Security and Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Technology highlights a growing awareness of the vulnerabilities associated with digital networks, particularly in a region where state-sponsored cyberattacks are increasingly prevalent.
Looking ahead, the CSC’s effectiveness will depend on several factors. Short-term, the Conclave is likely to continue to focus on operationalizing existing initiatives, such as joint maritime patrols and intelligence sharing, particularly in response to immediate threats. However, the increasing assertiveness of China in the IOR will undoubtedly complicate matters. A key challenge will be maintaining the unity of purpose among the member states, given their differing national interests and strategic alignments. Long-term, the CSC could evolve into a more robust regional security organization, potentially attracting additional partners and developing more sophisticated mechanisms for addressing shared challenges. However, without significant reforms and a clearer strategic vision, it risks becoming a largely symbolic gathering, unable to effectively counter the growing influence of external powers. The next NSA-level meeting, scheduled for early 2026, will prove critical in determining whether the CSC can navigate these competing forces and solidify its position as a cornerstone of regional security.