As Washington and New Delhi ink a 10-year defence partnership framework at the ADMM-Plus in Kuala Lumpur, the accord signals a strategic recalibration in Asia’s security architecture and a renewed commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.
A Strategic Pact in a Divided World
As cameras flashed inside the conference hall of the 12th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus in Kuala Lumpur, India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth clasped hands over a freshly signed document. It was more than a ceremonial gesture—it marked the formal beginning of a 10-year framework to steer one of the 21st century’s most consequential defence relationships.
For policymakers in Washington and New Delhi, the timing could not be more critical. The Indo-Pacific is undergoing a rapid military and technological transformation, from the South China Sea’s contested reefs to the Andaman Sea’s chokepoints. The new U.S.–India defence framework seeks to anchor bilateral cooperation amid shifting alliances, expanding Chinese influence, and a widening gap between regional deterrence needs and existing security architectures.
“Defence will remain the major pillar of our bilateral relations,” Singh stated following the signing. His words echoed the sentiment of many observers who view this accord as a defining pillar of regional stability.
The Strategic Depth of the U.S.–India Defence Framework
The 2025 defence framework is designed as a comprehensive policy roadmap, guiding cooperation across five primary domains: strategic coordination, military exercises, defence industry integration, emerging technologies, and information sharing. According to senior officials, the framework will not merely streamline bilateral ties—it will institutionalize them, transforming ad hoc collaborations into structured, multi-tiered mechanisms of coordination.
Unlike previous agreements, such as the 2015 U.S.–India Defence Framework and the series of foundational pacts (LEMOA, COMCASA, and BECA) that followed, the 2025 version incorporates an explicit vision for co-development and co-production in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and autonomous systems. This represents a decisive shift from a buyer-seller dynamic to one emphasizing joint innovation and industrial interdependence.
Dr. Lisa Curtis, Director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), notes, “This framework formalizes what has been building for years—a partnership grounded not only in shared threat perceptions but in shared technological and industrial ecosystems.”
A Historical Continuum of Convergence
The trajectory of U.S.–India defence cooperation has been shaped by gradual convergence rather than sudden alignment. The 2005 New Framework for the U.S.–India Defence Relationship laid the foundation for long-term engagement, while the 2016 designation of India as a “Major Defense Partner” institutionalized trust in defence trade and technology transfer.
The signing of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) in 2020 completed the quartet of foundational pacts, granting India access to U.S. geospatial intelligence and advanced navigation data—vital for precision targeting and situational awareness. Each successive milestone has built upon the last, enabling greater interoperability and joint operational planning.
The 2025 framework now adds a new layer: a strategic 10-year horizon that aligns defence objectives with the Indo-Pacific’s evolving security environment. This continuity underscores the shared recognition in Washington and New Delhi that long-term alignment is essential for regional deterrence and maritime resilience.
Indo-Pacific Realities: The Geopolitical Undercurrent
At the heart of this agreement lies a shared apprehension about the changing balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. China’s assertive posture in the South China Sea, rapid naval modernization, and expanding influence through the Belt and Road Initiative have reshaped regional threat perceptions. Simultaneously, the U.S. faces the challenge of maintaining forward presence and reassurance in a region where alliances are complex and multilateral structures—like ASEAN—often struggle to manage hard security dilemmas.
India, for its part, has adopted a more proactive role in regional security dialogues, from the Quad to ASEAN-led mechanisms. Its focus on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) as a strategic theatre aligns with U.S. efforts to ensure freedom of navigation and uphold the “rules-based international order.”
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India’s defence expenditure grew by 8.1 percent in 2024, reaching $83.6 billion—placing it as the world’s third-largest military spender. The United States, meanwhile, continues to lead global defence spending with $916 billion, underscoring the material asymmetry but also the scale of complementarity.
Military-to-Military Synergy and Industrial Cooperation
Under the new framework, joint military exercises such as Yudh Abhyas and Malabar are expected to expand in scope, incorporating multidomain operations that include cyber, space, and unmanned platforms. The agreement also envisions a greater focus on defence logistics and repair facilities in India to support U.S. and allied naval assets—a development with implications for regional sustainment networks.
Defence industrial cooperation is set to be a defining pillar. American firms are likely to deepen partnerships with Indian counterparts under the Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy (DPEPP), which emphasizes indigenization and technology infusion. The framework also seeks to streamline licensing processes and facilitate private-sector joint ventures in next-generation technologies, including directed-energy weapons, hypersonic systems, and secure communications.
According to the U.S.–India Business Council, bilateral defence trade has surged from less than $1 billion in 2008 to over $25 billion in 2025. This trajectory illustrates how industrial collaboration has become a barometer of strategic trust.
ASEAN and the Wider Regional Equation
That the agreement was signed on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus is not incidental. It signals both countries’ intent to align their bilateral agenda with regional multilateral frameworks. ASEAN, though traditionally nonaligned, remains the central convening platform for security dialogue in Asia.
India’s “Act East” policy and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy converge in their emphasis on ASEAN centrality, ensuring that the defence framework complements, rather than competes with, regional stability mechanisms. Japan and Australia—India’s partners in the Quad—are expected to view the new framework as a reinforcing factor in collective deterrence.
Professor Evan Laksmana of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) observes, “By anchoring the agreement within an ASEAN context, both nations have signaled that their partnership is meant to stabilize, not polarize, the regional order.”
Technology, Information, and Intelligence Sharing
A significant feature of the 2025 framework lies in its provisions for advanced information sharing and interoperability. Building upon BECA and COMCASA, the framework establishes new protocols for real-time intelligence exchange, cyber threat analysis, and satellite-based maritime domain awareness.
This is expected to enable coordinated surveillance of critical sea lanes such as the Malacca Strait and enhance situational awareness across the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific. India’s Defence Space Agency and the U.S. Space Command are also slated to engage in greater coordination, reflecting the growing centrality of space in modern defence planning.
Strategic Implications: The Road Ahead
Short-Term Outlook (2025–2030):
In the immediate years ahead, the framework is expected to institutionalize defence dialogues and accelerate procurement pipelines. India’s potential acquisition of U.S.-made armed drones, naval systems, and advanced radar technologies may deepen tactical interoperability. Regional partners, including ASEAN states and Pacific Island nations, will likely interpret the agreement as a stabilizing factor amid intensifying maritime competition.
Long-Term Outlook (2030–2035):
Over a decade, this framework could redefine the Indo-Pacific’s strategic geometry. Joint development projects and technology transfer could position India as a credible defence production hub, aligning with U.S. efforts to diversify global supply chains away from China. If effectively implemented, the agreement may create a trilateral synergy among the U.S., India, and key regional partners, fostering a sustainable security ecosystem anchored in shared capabilities rather than dependence.
However, sustaining momentum will depend on political continuity, bureaucratic agility, and domestic industry readiness on both sides. Divergences over procurement priorities, data governance, and export controls could test the framework’s resilience.
Conclusion: The Arc of Strategic Maturity
The new U.S.–India defence framework represents not just an agreement but an inflection point in the evolution of a partnership once marked by hesitation. It symbolizes a shift from transactional cooperation to strategic co-authorship in shaping the Indo-Pacific’s future.
As great-power competition intensifies and multilateralism faces strain, this decade-long pact underscores the enduring value of alignment based on shared principles rather than expedient interests. For policymakers and analysts, its true measure will lie not in the pages signed in Kuala Lumpur, but in the operational realities it shapes across the world’s most dynamic maritime theatre.
In the words of a senior South Asian security analyst, “This is not merely about defence—it is about defining the architecture of trust in a fractured world.”