The Five-Point Consensus, agreed to by ASEAN leaders in February 2021, outlined a roadmap for a peaceful resolution to the crisis following the military’s coup. It called for an end to violence, the release of detained politicians, the delivery of humanitarian aid, and dialogue among all stakeholders. However, implementation has been consistently stalled, primarily due to Myanmar’s military regime’s refusal to fully cooperate and its continued use of lethal force against pro-democracy protestors. The key to understanding the current situation lies in Cambodia’s evolving strategy, shifting from a more vociferous stance to one characterized by cautious engagement.
Cambodia, as the current ASEAN Chair, holds significant influence over the bloc’s agenda. Under Prime Minister Hun Manet, Phnom Penh has prioritized establishing direct communication channels with the military junta, spearheaded by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs PRAK Sokhonn. This approach contrasts sharply with the more critical voices initially expressed by other ASEAN members, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia. According to a recent report by the International Crisis Group, “Cambodia’s shift reflects a calculated assessment of the junta’s leverage and a desire to avoid a complete deadlock.” This strategy hinges on the recognition that the junta controls access to the country and effectively blocks any meaningful progress toward a political solution.
The motivations behind Cambodia’s shift are multi-faceted. Economically, Cambodia relies heavily on trade with Myanmar, and the instability within the country poses a significant threat to its burgeoning garment industry – a cornerstone of the Cambodian economy. Furthermore, Cambodia views the situation in Myanmar through the lens of its own internal political dynamics, particularly the challenges it faces regarding democratic reform. “Cambodia’s decision reflects a pragmatic understanding of Myanmar’s intransigence,” stated Dr. Lina Chan, Senior Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, “but it also raises concerns about the bloc’s credibility and willingness to hold the junta accountable.”
Recent developments further illustrate this shift. In September 2024, Cambodian officials facilitated a rare meeting between Deputy Prime Minister Sokhonn and Junta leader Min Aung Hlaing, reportedly focusing on logistical arrangements for the delivery of humanitarian aid. While the specifics of the agreement remain undisclosed, the fact that such a meeting occurred highlights Cambodia’s willingness to engage directly with the regime, a move that many ASEAN partners viewed as a betrayal of the initial principles. The junta, in turn, has reportedly utilized this access to improve its international standing, even seeking tacit support from countries like Russia and China.
The impact on broader ASEAN dynamics has been considerable. Indonesia, a vocal critic of the junta, has expressed disappointment with Cambodia’s approach, leading to a temporary suspension of joint activities. Malaysia, under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, has adopted a more nuanced stance, acknowledging the complexities of the situation while urging a return to the principles of the Five-Point Consensus. “ASEAN is at a crossroads,” argues Michael Green, Senior Associate Director for Middle East and North Africa Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “The bloc’s effectiveness hinges on its ability to maintain unity and exert pressure on the junta without completely isolating it.”
Looking ahead, the short-term outlook is bleak. Without a fundamental shift in the junta’s behavior, the delivery of humanitarian aid will likely remain severely constrained. The risk of further escalation of violence and instability in border regions – particularly involving Thailand and China – remains high. Long-term, the erosion of ASEAN’s credibility as a guarantor of peace and stability poses a serious threat to regional security. A possible scenario involves Cambodia successfully using its position as Chair to moderate the conflict, achieving limited, localized ceasefires, and fostering a gradual, incremental process of engagement with the junta. However, this is contingent on a willingness from all stakeholders – including China and Russia – to moderate their support for the regime.
Ultimately, the Five-Point Consensus, once a beacon of hope, now represents a testament to the challenges of applying consensus-based diplomacy in the face of authoritarianism. The coming months will reveal whether ASEAN can salvage its credibility, or whether the crisis in Myanmar will serve as a permanent reminder of the limitations of its influence. This situation compels a renewed reflection on the very nature of multilateralism in the 21st century, questioning the efficacy of pursuing consensus when faced with regimes unwilling to adhere to international norms.