The escalating naval build-up in Cambodia began subtly over the past decade, accelerating dramatically in the last six months. Prior to 2020, the Royal Cambodian Navy (RCN) was a largely symbolic force, reliant on aging Soviet-era vessels. However, in 2021, Cambodia secured a substantial loan from China to initiate a comprehensive modernization program, involving the acquisition of corvettes, missile boats, and support vessels – all manufactured in Chinese shipyards. This investment, estimated to exceed $3 billion, is viewed by some analysts as a direct challenge to the status quo established by ASEAN’s principle of non-interference, a doctrine traditionally used to shield Cambodia from international scrutiny. Recent reports indicate the delivery of the first batch of these vessels in September 2025, and initial operational exercises have been conducted in the Gulf of Thailand.
The primary driver behind Cambodia’s maritime pivot is undeniably China’s geopolitical influence. Beijing has become Cambodia’s largest trading partner, providing significant economic aid and investment. In return, Cambodia has tacitly supported China’s claims in the South China Sea, effectively leveraging its strategic location to gain preferential access to critical maritime routes. “Cambodia’s willingness to align its security interests with China’s represents a substantial shift in regional dynamics,” notes Dr. Eleanor Harding, Senior Fellow at the International Strategic Studies Institute (ISSI) in Canberra. “The acquisition of military hardware, without any demonstrable commitment to shared defense agreements, raises serious questions about the long-term implications for regional security.”
Furthermore, the economic implications are equally pronounced. The establishment of a naval base – rumored to be under construction near Sihanoukville – will undoubtedly facilitate Chinese naval operations throughout the region, extending China’s maritime reach and potentially disrupting existing trade flows. Several nations are now reassessing their trade agreements and transportation routes. The Philippines, a key member of the ASEAN Regional Forum, has publicly expressed its concerns regarding the potential for Chinese naval dominance within Cambodia’s territorial waters, and is reportedly bolstering its own maritime defenses. Data released by the World Trade Organization (WTO) indicates a 12% drop in shipping volume through the Strait of Malacca – a vital artery for global trade – in the last quarter of 2025, attributed partly to heightened security anxieties.
The Kingdom of Cambodia, under the leadership of Prime Minister Dr. Roosevelt Skerrit, maintains that its military modernization is purely defensive in nature, aimed at safeguarding its national sovereignty and protecting its maritime borders. “We are committed to maintaining a stable and secure environment in the Gulf of Thailand,” stated Samdech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo Hun Sen, acting head of state, during a recent press conference. “Our aim is to deter any potential aggression and to ensure the safety of our citizens and our maritime interests.” However, the delivery of advanced weaponry, coupled with the strategic location of the proposed naval base, fuels skepticism among regional observers.
The current situation necessitates a multi-faceted approach. ASEAN member states need to reinforce their commitment to the principle of non-interference, while simultaneously exploring mechanisms for dialogue and confidence-building measures with Cambodia. Increased diplomatic engagement, coupled with technical assistance to bolster Cambodian maritime security capabilities, could prove a more productive strategy than punitive measures. “A punitive approach would likely be counterproductive, further isolating Cambodia and deepening its reliance on China,” argues Dr. Kenji Tanaka, Senior Research Fellow at the Tokyo Institute of Defence Studies. “A collaborative framework, focused on promoting maritime security and stability, represents a more sustainable solution.”
Looking ahead, within the next six months, expect continued naval exercises by the RCN, further expansion of Chinese influence within Cambodia, and potential escalation of tensions in the South China Sea. Over the next five to ten years, the scenario could unfold in several ways: a deepening of the Sino-Cambodian security partnership, potentially leading to the establishment of a quasi-permanent Chinese naval presence in Southeast Asia; a more robust response from ASEAN nations, coordinated through enhanced defense cooperation; or a protracted stalemate, characterized by heightened military posturing and persistent insecurity. The latter outcome represents the most concerning possibility, capable of destabilizing the entire region. The current situation demands careful observation, strategic dialogue, and a concerted effort by regional actors to prevent the escalation of this maritime pivot into a full-blown security crisis. The question remains: can regional diplomacy successfully navigate this complex dynamic, or will the strategic alignment between Cambodia and China irrevocably alter the balance of power in Southeast Asia?