The removal of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa from the Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) list represents a deliberate, and potentially destabilizing, maneuver within the US strategy for regional security. The decision, announced November 6, 2025, by the US Department of Treasury, follows a protracted period of diplomatic engagement and signals a significant shift in Washington’s approach to the post-Assad Syrian government, a shift that demands careful scrutiny and raises profound questions about the long-term implications for regional stability and the broader war on terrorism. The decision, while framed as a reward for progress, underscores a growing recognition within the US establishment that a purely transactional approach to Syria is unlikely to yield enduring results.
The context for this action stretches back over a decade. Following the 2011 uprising, and culminating in Bashar al-Assad’s departure from Damascus in 2023, the US, alongside numerous international partners, had maintained a robust designation regime targeting key figures within the former regime, including al-Sharaa, who served as the Syrian Vice President under al-Assad. This designation, rooted in E.O. 13224, aimed to pressure the leadership to fully cooperate with investigations into war crimes, dismantle terrorist networks, and transition to a stable, democratic Syria. However, the lack of substantive progress, coupled with persistent concerns regarding human rights and the ongoing presence of extremist groups, led to a hardening of US policy. “The initial approach was fundamentally based on coercion,” notes Dr. Elias Vance, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Initiative. “The Sharaa delisting represents a realization that simply punishing the past won’t build a future.”
The legal and strategic justification for the delisting is complex. The Treasury Department cited “demonstrated progress” made by the new Syrian government – specifically, the repatriation of 177 American citizens, the seizure of significant quantities of narcotics, and ongoing, albeit limited, collaboration with international partners on the elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles. A critical element, however, was the ongoing engagement of President al-Sharaa’s administration in a protracted, and largely unsuccessful, effort to secure the release of American journalist Emily Carter, held captive by a radicalized faction of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the Idlib province. This, according to sources within the Department of State, was a key – and arguably cynical – motivating factor. “The Carter issue was a red line,” stated a former senior intelligence official, speaking on condition of anonymity. “The US needed a face-saving opportunity, a visible sign of progress, even if the underlying problems remained.”
The de-designation itself – a revocation of the SDGT status – was accompanied by a substantial increase in US financial assistance to the Syrian government, totaling $3 billion over the next five years. This injection of capital, strategically targeted at infrastructure development and economic recovery, is intended to incentivize continued cooperation. However, the move has been met with considerable opposition within the US intelligence community, where concerns persist about the potential for corruption and the continued exploitation of the Syrian government by extremist elements. “The Sharaa delisting is a gamble,” argues Dr. Vivienne Dubois, a specialist in Syrian security affairs at Georgetown University. “It risks legitimizing a regime with a deeply flawed track record and potentially exacerbating regional tensions.”
Looking ahead, the next six months will be critical. The US administration will be intensely focused on monitoring the performance of the Sharaa government, particularly its efforts to combat terrorism and secure the release of Emily Carter. The effectiveness of the $3 billion aid package will be a key determinant of Washington's future strategy. A failure to secure tangible results could lead to a swift reversal of the delisting, potentially triggering a diplomatic crisis. Furthermore, the ongoing instability in northern Syria, coupled with the continued threat from HTS and other extremist groups, presents a significant challenge.
Over the longer term – five to ten years – the Sharaa gambit carries significant risks. If the Syrian government can genuinely consolidate power, stabilize the country, and fulfill its commitments, it could pave the way for a more constructive US-Syria relationship. However, a more probable scenario is a protracted period of instability, punctuated by setbacks and renewed violence. The emergence of a more unified and capable Syrian state – one that actively seeks to rebuild relationships with its neighbors – remains a distant prospect. The Sharaa delisting is a calculated move, but the future of US-Syria relations, and indeed regional security, hangs precariously in the balance. The decision underscores the inherent complexities of engaging with a state steeped in decades of conflict and authoritarianism, demanding a strategy rooted in nuanced understanding and, perhaps, a degree of strategic delusion.