The Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF) between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Republic of Rwanda, launched in late 2024 with ambitious goals of unlocking economic potential within the Great Lakes region, is revealing a complex and, in several critical areas, frustrating trajectory. Initial optimism surrounding this initiative, driven largely by U.S. support and a shared desire to counter regional instability, is giving way to a more nuanced understanding of the deeply entrenched challenges and potential pitfalls. Six months into implementation, the REIF appears less a catalyst for transformative change and more a demonstration of the extraordinary difficulty of achieving lasting economic integration in a region scarred by decades of conflict and characterized by competing geopolitical interests.
The initial fanfare—annual summits, technical working groups—has yielded demonstrable results, primarily in the realm of public relations. The DRC and Rwanda have successfully framed the REIF as a testament to regional cooperation, garnering positive international attention and bolstering the political legitimacy of both governments. However, progress on the ground, particularly concerning the core objectives of formalized mineral supply chains and infrastructure development, remains severely limited. Data released in late October 2025 by the World Bank showed that cross-border trade, despite increased bilateral agreements, rose by a meager 3.7%—significantly below projections.
The mineral supply chain initiative, arguably the REIF’s most crucial component, faces considerable obstacles. The DRC’s artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sector, representing over 70% of the country’s mineral production, remains largely unregulated and operates primarily outside the formal economy. The establishment of traceability systems, a key element of the REIF, has been hampered by a combination of factors: a lack of formalized ASM permits, weak governance structures, persistent corruption, and the continued presence of armed groups controlling significant mining territories. As noted by Dr. Aminata Diallo, a political economist specializing in the Great Lakes region at the Institute for Strategic Studies, “The REIF’s ambitious goals are predicated on a level of institutional capacity and security that simply doesn’t exist in many parts of the DRC. Without addressing the root causes of insecurity and a systematic overhaul of governance, the entire framework will remain aspirational.”
Infrastructure development is similarly struggling. The Lobito Corridor, a vital transportation route connecting the DRC’s copper belt to the Atlantic coast, remains largely unusable due to ongoing security concerns and significant logistical bottlenecks. While progress has been made on upgrading roads in the border region between the two countries—particularly through Chinese-funded projects—these efforts have been largely disconnected from the broader REIF’s vision. Furthermore, the reliance on Chinese investment, while providing crucial capital, raises concerns about debt sustainability and potential geopolitical leverage. “The Chinese approach, while effective in terms of immediate infrastructure development, isn’t necessarily aligned with the long-term goals of the REIF,” argues Henri Muamba, a Senior Analyst at the Congo Institute for Strategic Research. “It’s a transactional relationship, and unless there’s a fundamental shift in governance and security, the Chinese won’t be incentivized to invest in projects that require a stable and transparent operating environment.”
The public health and safety component, initially presented as a cornerstone of the REIF, has also encountered setbacks. While joint monitoring of cross-border disease outbreaks has improved, the coordination mechanisms remain underdeveloped. The persistent threat of Ebola and other hemorrhagic fevers, exacerbated by weak healthcare infrastructure and limited cross-border collaboration, has undermined confidence in the REIF’s ability to effectively respond to public health crises. Recent intelligence reports suggest that armed groups continue to exploit the disruption of healthcare services as a tactic to destabilize the region.
Looking ahead over the next six months, the REIF is likely to remain largely focused on maintaining the facade of progress. The DRC and Rwanda will undoubtedly continue to emphasize the framework’s benefits in bilateral diplomatic engagements. However, sustained progress on concrete economic initiatives will depend on a far more fundamental shift in the region’s security landscape. Achieving this requires a concerted effort to address the root causes of conflict, including the ongoing presence of armed groups and the unresolved issue of land rights. The long-term (5-10 year) outcome hinges on a successful transition toward inclusive governance, which remains the biggest challenge.
Ultimately, the REIF represents a powerful demonstration of the immense difficulty of rebuilding shattered states and fostering economic integration in a region steeped in conflict. It underscores the need for a more nuanced and realistic approach to regional development, one that recognizes the limitations of top-down initiatives and prioritizes local ownership and genuine security. The question now is: will the international community recognize these challenges and adjust its support accordingly, or will the REIF continue to be a well-intentioned but ultimately ineffective exercise?