The persistent conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) represents a critical geopolitical challenge, increasingly intertwined with regional stability and international security interests. The ongoing violence, fueled by numerous armed groups and persistent ethnic tensions, has destabilized the Great Lakes region and demands sustained, multifaceted engagement. The second meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM), held in Washington D.C., September 17-18, 2025, while representing a formal step, reveals the immense difficulty in achieving a durable resolution, highlighting a precarious situation demanding careful scrutiny. The JSCM, established to oversee the implementation of the June 27, 2025 Peace Agreement between the DRC and Rwanda, is arguably a reflection of a complex, decade-long dynamic. The agreement itself, a product of intense diplomatic pressure from international partners, remains deeply contested, and its second attempt at operationalization demonstrates the deep-seated mistrust and structural impediments to genuine peace. This situation underscores a pivotal moment for the region’s future, one characterized by escalating instability.
The core of the JSCM’s mandate revolves around neutralizing the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and their affiliated groups within the DRC, while simultaneously facilitating the lifting of Rwanda’s defensive measures and restoring the DRC’s authority. However, the shared intelligence picture being developed, intended to underpin these efforts, is riddled with challenges. The FDLR, composed largely of génocidaires from the 1994 Rwandan genocide, operates within a complex network of local militias, often exploiting ethnic divisions and competing for control of natural resources. Their very existence represents a potent and enduring source of animosity. Furthermore, the operationalization of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) faces hurdles beyond simply confronting a defined enemy. The CONOPS, predicated on a phased approach, is dependent on the ability of the DRC military to effectively assume control, a process complicated by weak governance structures, corruption, and the persistent presence of armed groups. As Dr. Alistair Finch, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, stated, “The JSCM is operating in a deeply flawed environment. The DRC’s security forces are demonstrably overstretched and lack the capacity to effectively execute the CONOPS without significant external support.” This sentiment reflects a critical observation within the broader security community.
The Operational Order (OPORD) agreed upon, scheduled for implementation beginning October 1, 2025, represents an incremental advance, but its success remains far from assured. The OPORD’s focus on establishing a ‘shared intelligence picture’ is a vital, albeit complicated, process. However, the data being collected is inherently politicized, often shaped by the competing narratives of the DRC and Rwanda. The DRC government, understandably, views the FDLR as the primary threat, while Rwanda maintains that the FDLR's activities are facilitated by the DRC's lax security forces. This divergence in perspectives makes a truly unified approach difficult, feeding into a cycle of mistrust and counter-accusations. The State of Qatar's involvement, primarily as a facilitator and contributor of financial support, introduces further layers of complexity to the dynamic. Qatar’s strategic interests in the region, particularly its engagement in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance, cannot be disentangled from the political considerations at play. The African Union's role, through the facilitation of the Republic of Togo, is similarly constrained by its own internal political dynamics and the divergent priorities of its member states.
Recent developments over the past six months have painted a grim picture. Increased FDLR activity, coupled with renewed clashes between Congolese government forces and local militias, has underscored the fragility of the situation. Moreover, reports indicate that Rwandan forces, despite their commitment to withdrawing defensive measures, have continued low-intensity operations in eastern DRC, ostensibly to prevent the resurgence of the FDLR. The ongoing presence of other armed groups, including the M23, further complicates the situation. The M23, a predominantly Tutsi-led rebel group, has recently gained significant ground, exploiting the instability to advance its territorial ambitions. The escalation of violence in North Kivu province has prompted heightened international concern, prompting calls for increased sanctions against individuals and entities implicated in the conflict. According to data released by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), over 5.7 million people in eastern DRC are currently facing food insecurity, a direct consequence of the ongoing violence and displacement.
Looking forward, the short-term (next 6 months) is likely to see continued instability and sporadic violence. The JSCM’s efforts are unlikely to fundamentally alter the trajectory of the conflict. The implementation of the OPORD will likely be hampered by logistical challenges, security vulnerabilities, and persistent political tensions. The medium-term (5-10 years) scenario hinges on a critical shift in the dynamics of regional power and international engagement. Should the current trajectory persist, the Great Lakes region will remain trapped in a state of perpetual instability, with profound implications for regional security and humanitarian outcomes. A more optimistic, though still challenging, path would require a genuine commitment to inclusive governance, economic development, and the resolution of underlying ethnic tensions. This necessitates a multi-faceted approach, combining sustained diplomatic efforts, targeted security assistance, and investments in long-term development. However, the deep-seated mistrust between the DRC and Rwanda, coupled with the continued influence of external actors, presents a significant obstacle to achieving such a transformation.
The second JSCM meeting serves as a stark reminder of the intricate challenges inherent in peacemaking in conflict zones. The path forward is undoubtedly complex, demanding a nuanced understanding of the multiple layers of political, economic, and security factors at play. The challenge is not merely to neutralize a specific armed group, but to address the root causes of the conflict and build a sustainable peace. As General Pierre Mulele, a prominent Congolese nationalist and resistance leader, stated during the 1960s, "Peace cannot be imposed; it must be earned through justice and reconciliation." The question now is: can the international community, along with the DRC and Rwanda, muster the collective will and sustained commitment necessary to achieve this seemingly impossible goal? The outcome will determine the fate of millions and significantly shape the geopolitical landscape of the Great Lakes region for decades to come.