Historically, Western involvement in Somalia has been punctuated by periods of intense engagement followed by withdrawals, often hampered by a lack of sustainable political solutions and a failure to adequately address the underlying drivers of conflict. The 1991 intervention, while initially successful in ousting the Siad Barre regime, ultimately contributed to the rise of warlords and a protracted civil war. Subsequent attempts at nation-building, supported by UN peacekeeping missions and various donor states, have similarly struggled to achieve lasting stability, frequently facing obstruction from entities subject to sanctions. The 2006-2009 intervention, undertaken with the support of AMISOM, demonstrated the capacity for external forces to challenge al-Shabaab, but the organization’s resilient network and deep connections within Somali society continued to pose a significant threat. The current sanctions regime, reflecting a strategy largely shaped by these past experiences, seeks to isolate specific actors facilitating this continued instability.
Stakeholders involved in this dynamic include the Somali Federal Government (SFG), which, despite recognizing the need for external assistance, remains weak and vulnerable to competing factions; al-Shabaab, the militant group responsible for numerous terrorist attacks and holding territory within the country; regional administrations such as Somaliland and Puntland, which often operate with considerable autonomy and, at times, engage in actions that complicate international efforts; and international partners including the United States, the European Union, and the United Arab Emirates, each pursuing their own strategic objectives within the region. As Dr. Fatima Hassan, a senior researcher at the International Crisis Group, stated, “Sanctions alone are rarely sufficient. They require a broader, integrated approach that addresses governance, security, and economic development, alongside targeted enforcement.” The UK’s actions represent a focal point within this broader network, but its impact is severely constrained by the permeability of Somalia’s borders and the ingenuity of those seeking to circumvent sanctions.
Data released by the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) shows a relatively stable number of designations, with adjustments primarily focused on entities linked to charcoal trade – a key source of funding for al-Shabaab – and individuals involved in alleged misappropriation of state funds. Over the past six months, there has been a slight increase in designations related to shipments suspected of facilitating the movement of Somali military goods, a response directly tied to reports from the UN Panel of Experts on Somalia. A key chart outlining the most recent additions (as of February 28th, 2026) would reveal a pattern: predominantly small-scale trading companies and individuals operating within the charcoal sector. This reflects a tactical effort to disrupt a crucial revenue stream. However, these actions appear to be largely reactive, rather than proactive, in tackling the core issues of state fragility and corruption. Recent intelligence reports suggest a shift in al-Shabaab’s financing strategies, moving increasingly towards digital currencies and exploiting vulnerabilities in the Somali banking system, indicating a need for a more sophisticated and adaptive sanctions framework.
Looking ahead, the short-term (next 6 months) outlook suggests continued incremental adjustments to the sanctions list, primarily driven by intelligence updates and ongoing monitoring of illicit activities. The UK’s focus will likely remain on disrupting charcoal trade and targeting individuals involved in the illicit movement of weapons. However, a significant shift in the balance of power within Somalia, coupled with escalating regional tensions, could alter this dynamic. Long-term (5-10 years), the challenge remains the same: the UK’s sanctions regime is unlikely to fundamentally alter Somalia’s trajectory unless accompanied by a concerted effort to address the underlying drivers of instability – weak governance, corruption, and a lack of economic opportunity. Furthermore, the continued engagement of external actors, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia, introduces considerable complexity and could undermine the effectiveness of the UK’s efforts. “The problem isn’t just the entities sanctioned; it’s the systemic vulnerabilities that allow those entities to thrive,” argues Professor David Richards, a specialist in African security at King’s College London. “A truly effective strategy requires a holistic approach that goes beyond simply freezing assets.”
The evolution of the UK’s sanctions regime against Somalia presents a critical case study in the limitations of punitive diplomacy. While targeting specific actors can achieve tactical gains, it does little to address the deeper, systemic challenges facing the nation. The ongoing struggle highlights the need for a renewed, strategic engagement – one that prioritizes support for institutional reform, promotes economic diversification, and fosters genuine partnerships with the Somali people. The persistence of this conflict warrants reflection: are current strategies truly serving the goal of stability, or are they simply perpetuating a cycle of intervention and disillusionment?