Historically, the GMExZ’s genesis can be traced back to the 1990s, conceived as a mechanism to alleviate poverty and promote trade among the six ‘Mekong’ nations – Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and the People’s Republic of China. Initial momentum was fueled by China’s Belt and Road Initiative, seeking to expand its economic influence across Southeast Asia. However, the project’s implementation has been uneven, plagued by infrastructure deficits, bureaucratic hurdles, and differing priorities amongst member states. The 2015-2017 infrastructure boom, largely driven by Chinese investment in roads and railways, quickly revealed weaknesses in regulatory oversight and environmental protections, sowing seeds of distrust and resentment.
Stakeholders involved are markedly diverse. Vietnam, currently chairing ASEAN, is the primary driver of the GMExZ’s expansion, viewing it as a key component of its economic development strategy and a means to leverage its geographical advantage as a transit hub. Laos, heavily reliant on Chinese investment, benefits significantly from infrastructure development, though this dependence also exposes it to geopolitical risks. Thailand, despite being a founding member, has grown increasingly wary of the project’s impact on its automotive industry and strategic access routes through its territory. Myanmar remains a periphery player, largely excluded from the most lucrative aspects of the initiative due to ongoing political instability and international sanctions. Cambodia, benefiting from Chinese infrastructure investment, faces pressure to balance its economic gains with concerns about debt sustainability and the erosion of its sovereignty. China, while a significant investor, operates with a distinct agenda focused on securing resource access and promoting its own regional dominance.
Data reflecting GMExZ trade flows reveals a stark picture. While cross-border trade has increased, figures released by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in late 2025 showed that Vietnam accounted for 65% of total GMExZ trade, with Laos representing a distant 18%. Thailand’s contribution has been minimal, largely limited to agricultural exports, while Myanmar’s participation remains largely symbolic. Furthermore, a study by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in November 2025 highlighted a worrying trend: a growing disparity in infrastructure development, with Vietnam and Laos receiving the vast majority of investment, leaving Thailand and Cambodia lagging behind. “This creates a two-tiered system,” noted Dr. Elias Vance, Senior Fellow at CSIS specializing in Southeast Asian security. “It concentrates power and influence in the hands of Vietnam and China, potentially exacerbating existing geopolitical tensions.”
Recent developments over the past six months underscore this growing instability. Vietnam’s assertive stance regarding transit fees through Thai territory, demanding compensation for infrastructure upgrades, has triggered a diplomatic dispute. Simultaneously, reports from human rights organizations indicate increased Chinese involvement in resource extraction in Laos, raising concerns about environmental damage and labor exploitation. Thailand’s government has responded with a cautious approach, prioritizing bilateral negotiations while simultaneously seeking to strengthen its ties with other ASEAN partners, notably Singapore and Indonesia. The failure of a proposed regional investment fund to secure sufficient backing underscores the difficulty of fostering a shared financial commitment to the GMExZ.
Looking ahead, the short-term (next 6 months) likely scenario involves continued diplomatic maneuvering and incremental progress. Vietnam will continue to exert pressure on Thailand regarding transit fees, potentially leading to further trade disruptions. China’s influence within Laos will remain a significant factor, and Thailand will likely seek to diversify its trade routes and strengthen partnerships outside the GMExZ framework. Longer-term (5-10 years), the expansion of the GMExZ faces several significant hurdles. China’s evolving geopolitical priorities – shifting focus towards the Indo-Pacific – could lead to reduced investment in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the ongoing instability in Myanmar, coupled with potential shifts in ASEAN dynamics, threatens to derail the project’s overall ambition. “The GMExZ is a project built on fragile foundations,” argues Professor Anya Sharma, a specialist in Regional Integration at the National University of Singapore. “Its future depends on a level of trust and cooperation that currently doesn’t exist, and that is increasingly unlikely given the rising tide of national self-interest.” The project’s continued viability is dependent on a fundamental rethinking of its governance structure and a commitment to inclusive development that addresses the legitimate concerns of all member states.
Ultimately, the story of the GMExZ serves as a potent reminder that economic integration alone cannot guarantee regional stability. The complex interplay of national interests, strategic competition, and historical grievances demands a nuanced understanding of Southeast Asia’s shifting geopolitical landscape. The murky current of the Mekong – both literally and figuratively – demands careful navigation.