The MSA, signed in the wake of escalating Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea, was driven by Thailand’s desire to secure economic benefits – particularly access to critical shipping lanes and potential resource exploration opportunities – while simultaneously seeking to counterbalance China’s growing regional influence. Prior to 2017, Thailand’s foreign policy had been largely defined by a focus on strengthening ties with the United States, a cornerstone of its security architecture. However, the MSA represented a calculated pivot, facilitated by China’s increasing economic leverage and a perceived lack of decisive action from Washington. The agreement, granting China preferential access to Thai ports and naval facilities, triggered immediate criticism within ASEAN, with several member states voicing concerns about the potential for eroding the principle of consensus and undermining the legal foundations of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
“The MSA fundamentally altered the calculus within ASEAN,” notes Dr. Anya Sharma, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Strategic Studies in Bangkok. “Prior to 2017, the primary strategic imperative was maintaining a unified front against China’s assertive behavior. The MSA demonstrated a willingness to compromise that principle, creating a fissure within the bloc and forcing a reassessment of Thailand’s long-term strategic objectives.” Data from the ASEAN Secretariat reveals a decline in the number of joint naval exercises conducted by Thailand with other ASEAN members in the year following the MSA’s signing, a direct consequence of shifting priorities and the perceived strengthening of the Thai-China security relationship.
Key stakeholders include, of course, China, which sees the MSA as a validation of its claims in the South China Sea and a critical component of its broader Belt and Road Initiative. Thailand, under Prime Minister Somchai Wittayakit’s government, has consistently justified the agreement as a necessary step to ensure national security and economic prosperity. The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia – all parties involved in the South China Sea disputes – view the MSA with considerable suspicion, perceiving it as an endorsement of China’s expansive claims and a potential destabilizing force. Furthermore, the United States, while maintaining a distant but vital presence in the region, has expressed concerns about the erosion of ASEAN unity and the implications for freedom of navigation.
Over the past six months, the situation has intensified. China’s naval presence in the South China Sea has expanded significantly, including increased patrols near the First Island Chain. Thailand has increasingly participated in joint exercises with China, notably conducting a joint naval drill in the Gulf of Thailand in October 2025, a move that drew condemnation from Manila and Hanoi. Moreover, intelligence reports, recently leaked to Foreign Policy Watchdog, suggest that China is actively seeking to expand the operational footprint of the Thai navy, including potential upgrades to Thai naval facilities – a prospect that directly contradicts the terms of the MSA. “The potential for China to effectively repurpose Thailand’s naval assets represents a serious escalation,” states Dr. Kenji Tanaka, a specialist in maritime security at the Tokyo Institute of Technology. “It’s no longer simply about access to ports; it’s about the potential for Thailand to become a direct conduit for Chinese military activities in the region.”
Looking ahead, the short-term (next six months) is likely to be characterized by continued heightened tensions. We anticipate increased Chinese pressure on Thailand to further deepen the security relationship, potentially including additional joint military exercises and the provision of advanced weaponry. Thailand’s response will be crucial, balancing its economic dependence on China with its obligations to ASEAN and its broader strategic interests. Longer-term (5–10 years), the MSA’s legacy will be determined by Thailand’s ability to navigate this complex geopolitical landscape. A continued commitment to multilateralism and adherence to international law will be critical to mitigating the risk of a broader regional conflict. However, given the current trajectory, the potential for Thailand to become increasingly integrated into China’s sphere of influence remains a significant concern. The underlying question remains: can Thailand maintain its position as a credible ASEAN partner while simultaneously pursuing a strategic alignment with China, or is the MSA ultimately a destabilizing force within the region?
The agreement’s intended purpose – bolstering regional security – now seems tragically counterintuitive given the unfolding events. It serves as a potent reminder of the complexities inherent in balancing strategic partnerships and the enduring challenges of maintaining peace and stability in a region defined by competing interests and unresolved territorial disputes. The question is no longer whether Thailand will continue to benefit from the MSA, but whether the price of that benefit – a potentially compromised ASEAN and a heightened risk of regional conflict – is ultimately justifiable.