The immediate context for this diplomatic push is, frankly, concerning. Over the past six months, tensions surrounding the South China Sea have escalated, with China’s assertive territorial claims creating friction with Vietnam, the Philippines, and other claimant states. Simultaneously, the United States has intensified its naval presence in the region, deploying advanced warships and conducting freedom of navigation operations. This has led to heightened military posturing and an increasing risk of miscalculation. Thailand’s response, therefore, isn’t simply about bolstering trade; it is fundamentally a defensive strategy aimed at mitigating the potential impact of this broader geopolitical rivalry.
Historically, Thailand and India have enjoyed a remarkably resilient relationship. Bilateral trade has shown a consistent upward trajectory, reaching $17.5 billion in 2024, representing a 8.8% increase from 2023, making India Thailand’s 11th largest trading partner. This underscores a growing economic interdependence. Furthermore, India is Thailand’s largest source of tourists, contributing significantly to the Thai economy. However, these traditional ties are being augmented by a more strategic understanding. The elevation of bilateral relations to a “Strategic Partnership” during Prime Minister Modi’s visit in April 2025 has provided a formalized framework for cooperation. The upcoming visit by Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow builds on this momentum.
Key stakeholders in this evolving dynamic include, naturally, the Thai government, led by Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, and the Indian government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The National Security Advisor to the Indian Prime Minister, Ajit Doval, will likely be a key figure in shaping the discussions. Beyond governments, significant influence is exerted by think tanks like the Observer Research Foundation and the Gateway House of Contemporary Studies, which play a crucial role in shaping foreign policy discourse in both countries. According to a recent report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Thailand’s strategic alignment with India represents a subtle, yet important, counterbalance to China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia.”
The specific agenda of Minister Phuangketkeow’s visit is multi-faceted. A core focus will undoubtedly be on strengthening economic ties, particularly in sectors such as agriculture, tourism, and renewable energy. However, equally important will be discussions concerning security cooperation. Thailand’s vulnerability to transnational crime – particularly online scams, a rapidly evolving threat – presents a common concern. Furthermore, Thailand is seeking to position itself as a regional security provider, offering support in areas such as maritime security and counter-terrorism. The proposed international conference on global partnerships to combat online scams, to be hosted in Bangkok in December 2025, is a pivotal component of this strategy. The intention is to coalesce international efforts against this burgeoning criminal activity.
A critical aspect of Thailand’s strategic calculation is its position within ASEAN. Thailand’s ongoing efforts to mediate disputes within ASEAN, particularly regarding the South China Sea, demonstrate its commitment to regional stability. Minister Phuangketkeow will likely leverage this role to encourage greater regional cooperation and to promote a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. As Dr. R. Balasubramanyan, a specialist in Indian foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, notes, “Thailand’s ability to maintain neutral dialogue with both the US and China is a valuable asset, particularly as ASEAN seeks to navigate this increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.”
Looking ahead, the short-term (next 6 months) outcomes for Thailand are likely to be a series of high-level meetings and the signing of memoranda of understanding focused on economic collaboration. The success of the Bangkok conference on combating online scams will be a key indicator of Thailand’s ability to attract international attention and leverage its influence. Longer-term (5-10 years), Thailand’s strategic alignment with India could contribute to a more multipolar Indo-Pacific, challenging China’s dominance. However, this is contingent on maintaining stability within ASEAN and effectively managing the risks associated with the broader geopolitical competition. Failure to do so could lead to Thailand being caught in the crossfire, exacerbating regional tensions and undermining its own economic prospects. The next few years will be a critical test for Thailand’s strategic gamble.
The intent here is to provoke reflection. Can Thailand successfully navigate the competing interests of major powers while simultaneously safeguarding its own interests? How will regional alliances evolve in response to this shifting geopolitical landscape? The answers to these questions will have profound implications not just for Thailand, but for the stability of the Indo-Pacific and the future of global order.