The immediate catalyst for this reassessment is the 28th ASEAN-China Summit held in Kuala Lumpur on October 28th, 2025, where Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow played a key role in advocating for continued strengthening of the CSP. This event underscored a deeper strategic recalibration, built upon five years of evolving ties and demanding a revised assessment of Thailand’s relationship with Beijing. Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, as he emphasized, highlighted the “driving force” of the ASEAN-China relationship in fostering regional peace, stability, and prosperity. The summit’s agenda, heavily focused on economic integration and security cooperation, was notably shaped by Thailand’s own strategic considerations.
Historically, Thailand’s foreign policy has been characterized by a cautious, pragmatic approach towards China, rooted in a desire to maintain economic benefits while avoiding direct confrontation with the United States. The CSP, established in 2020, represented a significant departure from this traditional neutrality, signaling a willingness to deepen cooperation with Beijing across a broader range of domains. This strategy was fueled in part by Thailand’s reliance on Chinese investment and trade, as well as the strategic importance of China’s growing influence in the region. However, the summit revealed a recognition that this strategy needed adaptation.
Key stakeholders beyond Thailand include the People’s Republic of China, the United States, ASEAN member states (particularly Vietnam and Indonesia), and increasingly, India. China’s motivations are largely driven by economic expansion and regional influence, seeking to solidify its position as a dominant economic and political force in Southeast Asia. The US, under the Biden administration, is prioritizing the maintenance of its alliances in the Indo-Pacific region and actively seeking to counter China’s influence, presenting a sustained challenge to the CSP. Vietnam, bolstered by increased military modernization and a more assertive foreign policy, is demonstrating a growing desire to play a more active role in regional security, potentially diminishing Thailand’s leverage within the CSP. Indonesia, with its significant economic clout and growing military capabilities, is similarly adopting a more independent stance.
Data reveals a significant shift in trade dynamics. While China remains Thailand’s largest trading partner, data from the Thai Customs Department indicates a declining percentage of exports to China, coupled with a corresponding rise in imports. This trend is partly attributable to the expansion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the ongoing negotiation of the upgraded ACFTA 3.0. Furthermore, investment flows are increasingly diversifying, with investment originating from India and other Southeast Asian nations. According to the Bank of Thailand, foreign direct investment (FDI) from China decreased by 8% in 2024, while FDI from ASEAN neighbors increased by 12%.
“Thailand’s success will hinge on its ability to navigate this complex geopolitical landscape, not simply by siding with one power or the other, but by fostering a multipolar environment,” stated Dr. Prasit Ruchirayan, a Senior Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, during an exclusive interview. “A critical element will be strengthening Thailand’s position as a neutral facilitator, leveraging its diplomatic resources to manage disputes and promote regional cooperation.”
Looking ahead, the next six months will likely see continued efforts to refine the ACFTA 3.0 agreement and to attract investment from diverse sources. Longer-term, Thailand faces the challenge of balancing economic interdependence with strategic autonomy. Over the next five to ten years, the probability of Thailand pivoting more firmly towards India is increasing, driven by overlapping economic interests and shared security concerns regarding China’s assertiveness. This shift could involve increased military cooperation, expanded trade agreements, and greater participation in regional security forums. “Thailand needs to move beyond simply being a trading partner with China,” argued Dr. Somchai Srisanta, a specialist in Southeast Asian geopolitics at Chulalongkorn University, “It needs to actively shape the regional narrative and contribute to a framework of rules-based governance.” The nation’s success in this undertaking will significantly determine its position within the evolving geopolitical order of the Indo-Pacific. Maintaining stability in the Mekong region – a vital corridor for trade and connectivity – will remain a paramount objective, demanding careful diplomacy and strategic foresight.