Historically, the management of the Mekong’s water resources has been a complex ballet of negotiation, punctuated by periods of cooperation and punctuated by sharp disagreements. The 1996 Mekong Agreement established a framework for data sharing and collaborative planning, but ultimately failed to secure a robust, equitable system. Thailand, as the upper basin state, has long held a dominant position, utilizing the river for irrigation, hydropower generation, and industrial water supplies. Cambodia, reliant on the Mekong for agriculture and fishing, has consistently voiced concerns over the perceived inequitable distribution of water and the impact of Thai dam construction on downstream flows. The 2015 Mekong River Commission (MRC) agreement, a multilateral effort involving all six riparian nations (Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, and China), was ultimately stalled due to Cambodian resistance, further underlining the challenges of achieving consensus. The Joint Declaration, a bilateral agreement between Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin and Prime Minister Hun Manet, bypassed the MRC, signifying a dramatic shift in approach and a troubling erosion of multilateralism.
Key stakeholders include Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and increasingly, China. Thailand, under Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, has prioritized economic development and security, framing the Mekong management as crucial for national stability and economic growth. Cambodia, under Prime Minister Hun Manet, is navigating a delicate balance between economic development and asserting its sovereignty, fueled by a nationalist narrative and a desire to regain control over resources. Laos, largely dependent on Thai economic support, remains a relatively neutral player, though its strategic location makes it a point of concern. Vietnam’s rising economic and military power is adding another layer of complexity to the equation. China’s influence in the region, amplified by its Belt and Road Initiative and expanding infrastructure investments in Southeast Asia, presents a significant strategic challenge to all involved. According to a recent report by the International Crisis Group, “China’s strategic patience is increasing, and its willingness to pressure Thailand and Cambodia through economic leverage is growing.”
Data from the Mekong River Commission’s hydrological monitoring system reveals a concerning trend of declining water levels in the upper Mekong, attributed to a combination of climate change, deforestation, and upstream dam construction – primarily undertaken by China. The Prek Sah Laet reservoir, a key source of irrigation for Cambodian farmers, has experienced significant reductions in flow, prompting accusations of deliberate water manipulation by Thailand. “The situation is spiraling,” noted Dr. Emily Carter, a senior researcher at the University of Oxford’s Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, “The Joint Declaration is a symptom of a deeper malaise – a lack of trust and a willingness to prioritize short-term national interests over regional stability.” The MRC’s ability to independently verify water flows has been hampered by Thai restrictions.
The immediate impact of the Joint Declaration has been a hardening of positions, with increased military deployments along the border and heightened rhetoric from both sides. The signing of the declaration coincided with a series of military exercises conducted by both countries, further escalating tensions. Furthermore, the issue of access to the Prek Sah Laet reservoir remains a point of contention, with Thailand demanding unrestricted access for “research purposes” while Cambodia insists on retaining control over its water resources. A significant factor is the upcoming 2028 Thai general election, with the current government under Srettha Thavisin seeking to leverage the Mekong issue as a nationalist rallying cry.
Looking ahead, the next six months are likely to see further escalation of tensions, with the potential for armed clashes if diplomatic efforts fail. The resolution of the Prek Sah Laet issue is critical, but the broader problem of water rights and resource management will likely remain unresolved. Longer-term, the situation presents a serious challenge to the future of the Mekong River Commission and the broader regional alliance architecture. Without a fundamental shift in attitudes towards multilateralism and a genuine commitment to sustainable water management, the Mekong River basin risks becoming a flashpoint for conflict in Southeast Asia. The potential for China to further leverage its influence in the region remains a significant concern, and the risk of a broader regional confrontation is growing. The key lies in reviving the MRC and establishing a genuinely independent and impartial mechanism for managing the Mekong’s resources. However, the Joint Declaration signals a concerning trend of distrust and unilateralism, demanding a concerted effort from all stakeholders to prevent the river’s murky future from destabilizing the region. The fundamental question remains: can regional actors overcome nationalistic impulses and embrace a shared vision for the Mekong’s future?