The East Asia Summit, a bi-annual gathering of regional leaders, has consistently struggled to transcend its initial mandate as a forum for dialogue. Recent developments, particularly the evolving dynamics within Southeast Asia and the rising influence of China, demand a critical reassessment of the summit’s efficacy and, crucially, the enduring relevance of its foundational agreement, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). The summit’s next iteration, scheduled for November 2025, represents an opportune moment to confront the growing dissonance between the summit’s aspirational goals and the stark realities of the Indo-Pacific security landscape. The TAC, signed in 2002, ostensibly aimed to foster regional security and prosperity, yet its limitations have become increasingly apparent in the face of geopolitical competition and unresolved disputes. A recent analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimates that the summit’s primary contribution has been to provide a platform for countries to maintain diplomatic channels, rather than driving substantive progress on critical issues like the South China Sea or the Myanmar crisis.
The genesis of the East Asia Summit lies in a perceived vacuum of leadership following the 9/11 attacks and a desire to establish a multilateral framework for addressing emerging security challenges. The initial membership—Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—reflected a strategic effort to balance China’s growing power with the interests of established Western democracies and Southeast Asian states. The TAC, a non-binding agreement, promised cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism, disaster management, and economic development. However, the lack of enforcement mechanisms and the diverse priorities of the participating nations have consistently undermined the summit’s ability to achieve concrete outcomes.
Historically, the TAC’s effectiveness has been predicated on implicit understandings and a willingness to avoid direct confrontation. This approach has proven increasingly vulnerable to the assertive behavior of China, particularly regarding its territorial claims in the South China Sea. The Philippines’ ongoing arbitration case, while legally significant, has not triggered any meaningful response from China, and the summit has largely failed to generate concerted pressure on Beijing. Furthermore, the summit’s approach to Myanmar, following the 2021 military coup, has been similarly muted. Despite widespread international condemnation, the EAS has offered no tangible support to the pro-democracy movement and has largely avoided direct criticism of the regime. “The TAC has evolved into a comfortable zone of polite disagreement,” explains Dr. Amit Sharma, a regional security analyst at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. “The emphasis on dialogue often prioritizes maintaining relationships over addressing difficult issues.”
Data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance 2025 reveals a significant escalation in military activities within the region, with China’s naval modernization program posing a growing challenge to regional stability. Australia’s increased defense spending and renewed focus on Indo-Pacific security, coupled with the United States’ strategic rebalancing, has created a complex multi-polar dynamic. The rise of Indonesia as a regional power and its own evolving security policies further complicate the situation. The summit’s capacity to effectively mediate between these competing interests remains limited.
Recent developments suggest a growing disillusionment with the East Asia Summit’s utility. The ASEAN chair’s rotating presidency, currently held by Indonesia, has highlighted the limitations of the regional architecture. Indonesia has been actively promoting alternative mechanisms for addressing regional security concerns, including the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting – Expanded (ADMM-E) and the newly established ASEAN Post-Crisis Response Mechanism (PCRM). These initiatives, while still in their nascent stages, demonstrate a recognition that the East Asia Summit is no longer sufficient to address the complex challenges facing the Indo-Pacific.
Looking ahead, the next East Asia Summit will undoubtedly be dominated by the ongoing tensions surrounding the South China Sea and the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. The summit’s primary contribution is likely to remain facilitating regular communication, but a fundamental shift in its approach is needed. This requires a willingness to confront difficult issues, regardless of the potential for short-term diplomatic friction. “The TAC needs a ‘reset’,” argues Dr. Fiona Henderson, a political scientist specializing in Southeast Asia at Griffith University. “It can’t continue to operate as a passive observer in a region characterized by rapid shifts in power and escalating geopolitical competition.”
Short-term, within the next six months, we can expect the summit to continue to serve as a predominantly symbolic gathering. However, the increased engagement from countries like India – evidenced by its active participation and support for alternative frameworks – suggests a broadening of the regional security landscape. Long-term, the future of the East Asia Summit hinges on the willingness of its members to move beyond the constraints of the TAC and embrace a more proactive approach to addressing shared challenges. A failure to do so risks relegating the summit to a purely ceremonial role, further diminishing its relevance in the evolving Indo-Pacific. The fundamental question remains: can the East Asia Summit adapt to the realities of the 21st century, or will it be consigned to the footnotes of history as a failed experiment in regional multilateralism?