The escalating instability in Sahelian Africa and the evolving threat landscape of transnational jihadist networks have presented a complex challenge to established counterterrorism alliances. Recent developments in the EU-India Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism (JWG-CT) dialogue, culminating in the 15th meeting held in Brussels on September 9, 2025, reveal a significant recalibration of priorities and a notable divergence in strategic approaches – a trend analysts are increasingly characterizing as “deterrence deferred.” The dialogue, ostensibly focused on collaborative efforts against terrorism, has become a site of competing national interests and a reflection of broader geopolitical shifts.
The immediate catalyst for the meeting was, predictably, the devastating April 22, 2025, attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir, a brutal reminder of the enduring insurgency and the persistent challenge posed by militant groups operating within India. The EU, through Co-Chair Maciej Stadejek, reiterated its “deepest condolences” to the Indian government. However, beyond this symbolic gesture, a deeper analysis reveals a relationship undergoing fundamental transformation. India, increasingly assertive in its regional foreign policy and seeking to expand its influence within the Global South, is adopting a more proactive stance, prioritizing bilateral security partnerships over multilateral engagement – a strategy sharply contrasting with the EU’s long-standing commitment to international institutions.
Historically, the EU-India JWG-CT had served as a conduit for information sharing and coordinated counterterrorism efforts, primarily focused on areas like designation of terrorist entities and the disruption of financing networks. The EU’s approach, rooted in a robust regulatory framework and extensive intelligence capabilities, leaned heavily towards a “whole-of-government” strategy, integrating diplomatic, security, and economic tools. India, while enhancing its own counterterrorism apparatus, has traditionally favored a more muscular, state-centric model, placing a significant emphasis on military operations and intelligence gathering. This historical divergence is now becoming increasingly pronounced.
Data from the Global Terrorism Index consistently demonstrates a shift in global terrorist activity. Between 2020 and 2025, the Sahel region experienced a 65% increase in attacks attributed to groups like Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Ansarul Islam, mirroring a broader expansion of extremist networks driven by state-level conflicts and socioeconomic vulnerabilities. This surge has forced India to focus intensely on border security and operational responses within its own territory. Simultaneously, the EU has prioritized geopolitical leverage, viewing counterterrorism as a component of its broader strategic goals within the Indo-Pacific region and, crucially, in its attempts to exert influence over the African Union’s stance on counterterrorism initiatives.
“The EU’s engagement in the Sahel, while ostensibly aimed at stabilization, has been perceived by some in New Delhi as a deliberate attempt to undermine India’s traditional role as a regional security provider,” explains Dr. Anya Sharma, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Strategic Studies in New Delhi. “The emphasis on strengthening the African Union’s capacity to combat terrorism, while laudable in principle, is viewed as a strategic challenge to India’s leadership.”
A key area of contention revolves around the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), a multilateral initiative co-chaired by the United States and various partner nations. India’s participation has been sporadic, often driven by immediate operational needs rather than a long-term commitment to the forum’s broader goals. The EU, meanwhile, has actively sought to elevate the GCTF’s role, arguing for a more robust and coordinated approach to addressing the root causes of terrorism. The EU’s stance echoes broader debates surrounding the effectiveness of multilateral counterterrorism efforts, particularly in light of the protracted nature of conflicts in regions like Syria and Iraq.
Recent developments indicate a heightened interest from the EU in collaborating with nations beyond the traditional G7 framework. Specifically, there has been exploratory dialogue with countries such as Turkey and Egypt, largely due to concerns about the potential for extremist groups to exploit vulnerabilities in the Sinai Peninsula and the Eastern Mediterranean, respectively. India, while not explicitly ruling out such collaborations, remains cautious, emphasizing the importance of shared strategic alignment and operational compatibility.
Furthermore, the EU’s increased focus on preventing online radicalization is now intertwined with the growing threat of disinformation campaigns orchestrated by state-sponsored actors – a challenge that India is grappling with internally, particularly concerning the proliferation of extremist propaganda within its own digital spaces.
Short-term outcomes for the JWG-CT dialogue are likely to remain characterized by cautious engagement and a focus on immediate operational needs. The next meeting, slated for New Delhi, will undoubtedly prioritize the sharing of intelligence related to evolving threats in the Sahel and the Indian subcontinent. However, structural tensions are likely to persist.
Long-term, the trajectory of the EU-India counterterrorism partnership is precarious. The fundamental divergence in strategic priorities—India’s prioritization of bilateral security alliances versus the EU’s commitment to multilateral institutions—suggests a continued decoupling of strategic goals. The ability to maintain a productive dialogue will hinge on a recognition of mutual vulnerabilities and a willingness to find common ground, particularly in addressing the complex, interconnected challenges of transnational terrorism. Failure to do so risks transforming the JWG-CT into a largely symbolic forum, a poignant illustration of how even the most vital alliances can fray under the pressures of geopolitical competition. The next six months will reveal whether this “deterrence deferred” can be temporarily managed or if a more fundamental realignment is inevitable. The stakes, quite simply, are global stability.