The backdrop to this interaction is a complex one. For decades, Bhutan, nestled between India and China, has served as a critical buffer state. India’s strategic interest in maintaining this buffer, coupled with China’s increasingly assertive presence, has created a tense equilibrium. Thailand, traditionally a close ally of India, is now leveraging this situation to establish a more robust and diversified network of partnerships. The primary driver of Thailand’s engagement is GMC – a bold, ambitious project spearheaded by the Bhutanese government aimed at transforming Gelephu into a thriving economic hub. The project’s “One Country, Two Systems” framework, echoing Hong Kong’s governance model but adapted to Bhutanese circumstances, envisions a blend of foreign investment, international expertise, and Bhutanese control, promising significant economic growth and employment opportunities.
Historically, Thailand’s foreign policy has been defined by a pragmatic approach – fostering relationships with countries across the spectrum, from India to China, and from ASEAN partners to Western democracies. This ethos is now being translated into tangible investments. Prior to 2023, Thailand’s engagement with the region was largely focused on trade and tourism. However, the growing recognition of the strategic importance of the Himalayas – particularly the potential for China to exert greater influence – prompted a reevaluation of Thailand’s approach. The 2025 State Visit to Bhutan by Their Majesties the King and Queen of Thailand, which included a state dinner at the Thimphu Royal Polo Club, followed by a meeting with Prime Minister Lotay Tshering, served as a crucial preliminary step. The forthcoming Honorary Doctorate Degrees conferred by Chulalongkorn University in December 2025 on Bhutanese leaders further solidifies the bond.
Data from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) indicates a projected 8% GDP growth for Bhutan over the next five years, fueled largely by tourism and infrastructure development. Thailand’s involvement in GMC is intended to substantially accelerate this growth, bringing in an estimated $1.2 billion in foreign direct investment over the next decade, according to projections released by the Bank of Thailand in July 2025. Crucially, Thailand is offering technical expertise, particularly in urban planning, transportation, and digital infrastructure – areas where Bhutanese capacity is currently limited. As stated by Dr. Anya Sharma, Senior Fellow at the International Strategic Studies Institute (ISSI) in Bangkok, “Thailand recognizes that securing a stable and prosperous Bhutan is not merely an altruistic endeavor; it’s a critical component of a balanced strategic portfolio within the Indo-Pacific.” Sharma emphasizes the long-term security implications, arguing that a thriving Bhutan, resistant to undue pressure from either India or China, represents a significant geopolitical asset.
However, the investment isn’t without potential friction. India’s strategic concerns regarding China’s proximity to its borders remain paramount. New Delhi has quietly expressed reservations about the “One Country, Two Systems” framework, viewing it as a potential conduit for Chinese influence. Despite these concerns, Prime Minister Narendra Modi reportedly issued a personal assurance to His Majesty King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck during a phone call in August 2025, acknowledging the importance of the GMC project and reinforcing India’s commitment to Bhutan’s sovereignty. This signals a delicate balancing act—one where India seeks to maintain its strategic advantage while simultaneously recognizing the need for collaborative development.
Looking ahead, the short-term (6-12 months) outcomes are likely to be focused on initiating construction of key infrastructure components within GMC – particularly the transportation network connecting Gelephu to the rest of Bhutan and, eventually, India. The early stages of the project will undoubtedly be scrutinized by both India and China, each seeking to assess Thailand’s level of influence and the potential for leveraging the project to advance their respective strategic objectives. Longer term (5-10 years), the success of GMC will determine Thailand’s continued relevance in the region. A flourishing GMC could cement Thailand’s position as a key economic partner, potentially giving it significant leverage in regional trade and diplomatic negotiations. Conversely, if the project faces significant delays or economic difficulties, it could damage Thailand’s reputation and undermine its strategic ambitions.
Ultimately, the Gelephu Gambit represents a significant, if somewhat risky, play by Thailand. The core question remains: can Thailand successfully navigate the complex geopolitical currents of the Himalayas and forge a genuinely beneficial partnership with Bhutan, or is this a calculated maneuver intended to maximize its own strategic advantage in a region increasingly characterized by instability and competition? The answer will shape not just Thailand’s future, but the broader balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.