The escalating instability across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger represents a cascading crisis, fueled by a confluence of factors including weak governance, economic hardship, and the persistent influence of groups like Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). The UK’s response, largely channeled through the ISF since 2018, reflects a pragmatic assessment: failing to address the security vacuum would create a space for transnational criminal networks and further undermine regional stability. The program’s deployment – focused on training, equipment provision, and capacity building – is a direct response to a perceived threat to UK national security interests, specifically safeguarding trade routes and countering the potential for terrorist activity emanating from the Sahel to impact the UK.
## The Genesis of Strategic Intervention
The seeds of the ISF were sown in the aftermath of the 2012 Libyan conflict and the subsequent rise of militant groups operating across the Sahel. Prior to this, the UK’s engagement in the region primarily focused on development assistance and promoting good governance. However, the emergence of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the growing capabilities of Jihadi groups necessitated a more assertive security approach. The original framework for the ISF, formalized in 2018, was initially designed to support counter-terrorism operations in countries directly bordering the Sahel, with a primary emphasis on providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. This shift reflected a growing understanding among Western intelligence agencies that the Sahel was becoming a staging ground for global jihadist networks.
A key historical precedent is the long-standing British involvement in West Africa, dating back to the colonial era. This legacy, coupled with the post-Cold War intervention in Sierra Leone and Liberia, established a foundation for future security partnerships. However, the ISF represents a significant departure, driven by a perceived necessity to proactively address evolving security threats rather than primarily responding to humanitarian needs.
Data released by the Department for International Development (DfID) – now integrated within the (FCDO) – indicates that as of late 2023, the ISF had committed over £1.3 billion across 33 projects, primarily concentrated in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. A substantial portion (approximately 65%) of this funding has been allocated to training and advising security forces, with the remainder distributed across equipment procurement, logistical support, and technical assistance. A significant increase in funding occurred in 2022 and 2023, driven by the escalating crisis and increased operational requirements.
“The core aim of the ISF is to build the capacity of partner governments to protect their populations and secure their borders,” states Dr. Alistair Duncan, a senior fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), specializing in African security. “However, the inherent challenges of operating in complex and volatile environments, coupled with the limitations imposed by operational security, mean that measuring the program’s actual impact is exceptionally difficult.”
## Stakeholders and Their Calculations
Several key stakeholders are involved in the ISF’s implementation, each with distinct motivations and priorities. The UK government, naturally, views the program as a critical component of its broader security strategy, seeking to mitigate risks to its citizens and protect its economic interests. The French military, through Operation Barkhane, operates alongside the ISF, creating a complex dynamic of cooperation and potential friction.
The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, while ostensibly the primary beneficiaries of the ISF, face a more nuanced situation. Initially welcomed as a source of vital security assistance, the program’s opaque nature and the UK’s increasingly assertive approach have eroded trust and fueled resentment. The recent coups in Burkina Faso and Niger, coupled with the deterioration of relations with Western partners, have significantly complicated the ISF’s operation.
Furthermore, regional actors like Russia (through the Wagner Group) are actively competing for influence in the Sahel, posing a direct challenge to the UK’s strategic objectives.
“The ISF’s success hinges on the willingness of partner governments to engage constructively and align their security priorities with those of the UK,” argues Professor Catherine Hughes, a specialist in African politics at SOAS University of London. “However, the current political instability and the rise of alternative security providers are severely undermining this cooperation.”
## Recent Developments and Shifting Dynamics
Over the past six months, the ISF has faced several significant challenges. The withdrawal of French forces from Mali in August 2023, following a breakdown in relations with the government, left a security vacuum that the ISF has struggled to fill. The deteriorating security situation in the Sahel, marked by increased attacks by Jihadi groups and the emergence of new threats, has placed immense pressure on the program’s resources. Moreover, sanctions imposed on the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger following the coups have further restricted the UK’s ability to conduct operations and provide assistance. A crucial element of recent funding has been directed toward supporting local communities and bolstering governance structures, a shift reflecting an acknowledgement of the underlying drivers of instability.
## Future Impact & Insight
Short-term (next 6 months), the ISF will likely continue to provide support to the remaining security forces in Mali and Niger, albeit with reduced effectiveness due to the ongoing instability. Long-term (5-10 years), the program’s future is highly uncertain. The rise of the Wagner Group as a dominant security provider in the region could significantly diminish the UK’s influence, while the political instability in the Sahel could lead to a complete cessation of ISF operations.
The ISF’s legacy will be shaped by its ability to adapt to the rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. A more flexible and collaborative approach, prioritizing local ownership and sustainable governance solutions, will be essential for achieving lasting security outcomes.
Ultimately, the ISF’s story serves as a cautionary tale about the complexities of strategic intervention. It underscores the importance of understanding local contexts, building trust with partners, and acknowledging the limitations of military solutions to complex security challenges.
It is time to reflect on the effectiveness of this long-term investment, and consider how global security strategies should adapt in an era of increasingly volatile and interconnected geopolitical landscapes.