The immediate context of this visit, scheduled for November 26-28, 2025, is layered with historical precedent and a pragmatic, bordering on assertive, approach to regional governance. Cambodia and Laos, sharing a substantial border and a history of intertwined political and economic relations, have traditionally cooperated closely within the framework of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) initiative. However, the dynamics have undergone a noticeable alteration in the last decade, fueled by Beijing’s expanding influence and a desire within both nations to act as a cohesive bloc against perceived external pressures. According to Dr. Michael Green, Senior Associate Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The JCBC meetings are now more than just routine discussions; they’re a deliberate attempt by Cambodia and Laos to create a counterweight to regional trends dominated by China.”
Historical Background: A Legacy of Shared Waters and Mutual Dependence
The Mekong River has been a vital resource for Cambodia and Laos since ancient times, dictating their economies and shaping their geopolitical identities. The establishment of the GMS in 1994, with the participation of China, ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea, aimed to promote trade and infrastructure development along the Mekong. However, the project’s success has been uneven, with significant disputes over water management and resource allocation. The 1995 Mekong Agreement, a key treaty governing water sharing, is increasingly viewed as inadequate, particularly given the growing demands of upstream development, primarily by China. “The upstream water diversion has undeniably heightened tensions, forcing a recalibration of regional diplomacy,” explains Professor Paul van der Velde, a specialist in Southeast Asian security at the University of Leiden.
Key Stakeholders and Motivations
Several key stakeholders contribute to this evolving landscape: China, the primary investor and upstream water manager; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), seeking to maintain regional unity and address transboundary issues; and the United States, which has a strategic interest in maintaining stability in the region and countering Chinese influence. Cambodia and Laos, motivated by economic development, security concerns, and a desire to secure their access to the Mekong, are increasingly aligning their interests with Beijing. The Cambodian government, under Prime Minister Hun Manet, has been particularly vocal in advocating for a “dual-track” approach – balancing relations with ASEAN while pursuing strategic partnerships with China. Laos, facing significant infrastructure development projects driven by Chinese investment, is similarly navigating a delicate balancing act.
Recent Developments and Strategic Alignment
Over the past six months, several developments have solidified this strategic alignment. Cambodia’s approval of the Xepong 4 hydropower project, heavily financed by China, despite ongoing concerns about its impact on downstream flows, signaled a shift in priorities. Furthermore, joint military exercises between Cambodian and Chinese forces have become more frequent, demonstrating a deepening security partnership. The construction of the Don Det Deep Sea Port, a Chinese-backed project intended to facilitate trade and tourism, further highlights the mutual benefit derived from this cooperation. Data from the Mekong River Commission shows a consistent increase in Chinese water diversion upstream, impacting the flow to the Cambodian and Laotian sides of the river, prompting increasingly assertive diplomatic statements from Phnom Penh and Vientiane.
Future Impact and Insight
Short-term (next 6 months): We anticipate continued intensification of this strategic alignment. The 15th JCBC meeting is likely to focus on finalizing agreements related to infrastructure projects, including the Don Det Port and further expansion of the Xepong projects. Increased joint military drills are expected, and diplomatic pressure from ASEAN member states regarding water management will likely intensify. However, the United States and other external actors will attempt to mediate and encourage greater transparency and cooperation with ASEAN.
Long-Term (5-10 years): The long-term implications are potentially destabilizing. A fully consolidated Cambodia-Laos bloc, firmly aligned with China, could significantly alter the regional balance of power, potentially leading to further fragmentation within ASEAN and a diminished role for the United States. The growing competition for resources along the Mekong, coupled with the environmental impacts of upstream development, poses a serious threat to the long-term sustainability of the region. Furthermore, the potential for increased military cooperation between Cambodia and China raises concerns about regional security and the possibility of escalation. “The long-term stability of the Mekong Basin hinges on the ability of ASEAN and external partners to foster a more equitable and sustainable approach to water management and regional security,” concludes Dr. Green. The challenge remains: can the region find a way to manage the competing demands of economic development and environmental sustainability, while maintaining a cohesive regional framework?