The initial impetus for this evolving relationship stems from shared anxieties regarding China’s growing influence in the Mekong. Beijing’s assertive infrastructure investments, particularly the Xayu Dam project in Laos, have fueled Thai concerns about water security, downstream flooding, and the potential for China to gain disproportionate control over vital waterways. Simultaneously, Bangladesh has emerged as a crucial player in regional maritime security, particularly in addressing piracy and transnational crime within the Bay of Bengal, an area adjacent to the Mekong Delta. The Bangladeshi navy’s increasingly active patrols and collaboration with international partners to combat maritime threats mirror Thailand’s own growing anxieties about security vulnerabilities. This mutual recognition of shared challenges is now being translated into practical cooperation.
Historically, Thailand’s engagement with the Mekong has been largely channeled through the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) program, a World Bank-backed initiative focused on infrastructure development and trade facilitation. The GMS, launched in 1992, has facilitated considerable investment in transportation networks, energy projects, and small business development. However, critics argue that the GMS has often prioritized China’s interests and failed to adequately address the concerns of smaller, less powerful riparian states. The emergence of Bangladesh as a strategic partner represents a potential recalibration of this dynamic. Bangladesh’s own ambitious infrastructure projects, including port development and connectivity initiatives, are increasingly intersecting with the broader Mekong connectivity agenda. Data from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) indicates a 18% increase in investment flows from Bangladesh into Southeast Asia over the past five years, largely focused on transportation and energy.
Key stakeholders involved in this shifting alliance include the Thai government, under Prime Minister Somsak Chalermsook, which has prioritized strengthening bilateral ties with Bangladesh, and the Bangladeshi government, led by Prime Minister Rahman Khan, who has actively sought to expand its regional influence. The involvement of regional organizations, notably ASEAN, remains crucial, though currently characterized by cautious observation. The ADB has become a significant facilitator, providing technical assistance and funding for collaborative projects. Furthermore, the Maldives and Sri Lanka, both facing similar geopolitical pressures related to China’s influence in the Indian Ocean, are quietly monitoring the developments.
Recent developments over the past six months have solidified this trend. In July 2025, Thailand and Bangladesh co-hosted a maritime security seminar focusing on counter-piracy and maritime domain awareness. This was followed by a joint exercise involving naval personnel from both nations in the Andaman Sea. Moreover, discussions are underway regarding a potential joint development project to improve the efficiency of the maritime transportation routes connecting the Mekong Delta with Southeast Asia. According to a report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the increasing frequency of high-level meetings between Thai and Bangladeshi officials signifies a deliberate effort to forge a “parallel” strategic engagement, challenging the existing ASEAN-dominated framework. The strategic importance of the Andaman Sea, a vital shipping lane, is attracting increased focus from both nations.
Looking ahead, the short-term (next 6 months) likely will see continued expansion of security cooperation, including joint patrols and capacity-building initiatives. Thailand is expected to formally invite Bangladesh to participate in future GMS projects, leveraging its maritime expertise. However, this could also lead to increased tensions within ASEAN, with some member states expressing concerns about a potential division of the sub-region. Longer-term (5-10 years), the Bangladesh-Thailand alignment could become a more pronounced force, potentially reshaping the balance of power within the Mekong sub-region and challenging China’s dominance. The development of a robust maritime infrastructure network, facilitated by this partnership, could dramatically alter trade routes and economic flows. A further outcome could be increased competition for resources and influence amongst the regional actors.
This evolving dynamic represents a powerful reminder of the fluid nature of geopolitical alliances and the increasing importance of smaller, strategically positioned nations. The Bangladesh-Thailand nexus underscores a fundamental truth: that stability in Southeast Asia, and indeed globally, depends not only on the actions of major powers but also on the astute navigation of relationships between diverse actors. The question now is whether this growing collaboration will ultimately contribute to a more resilient and equitable regional order, or whether it will exacerbate existing divisions and create new sources of instability. It is a conversation that demands careful consideration – and active engagement – from all stakeholders.