The situation in the Sahel—encompassing Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, and increasingly, parts of Sudan—is a complex confluence of factors, rooted in colonial legacies, resource competition, and the rise of non-state actors. Historically, the French colonial administration established a deeply unequal system, prioritizing resource extraction—primarily uranium—while neglecting the needs and aspirations of local populations. This fostered resentment, exacerbated ethnic divisions, and ultimately, facilitated the conditions for later instability. The 1960 independence from France, initially heralded as a victory, quickly revealed the enduring influence of French economic and political interests, culminating in Operation Barkhane—a military intervention launched in 2013 to combat jihadist groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS.
The initial justifications for Barkhane—primarily counterterrorism—have morphed into a prolonged and increasingly ineffective presence. Data from the International Crisis Group indicates that while the French-led mission has degraded the capabilities of extremist groups, it has simultaneously contributed to a militarization of the region, fueling recruitment and reinforcing the narrative of resistance. The 2020 military coup in Mali, led by Colonel Assimi Goïta, signaled a profound rejection of French influence and a shift towards closer ties with Russia, evidenced by the subsequent deployment of Wagner Group mercenaries. This move dramatically altered the geopolitical landscape, creating a security vacuum and emboldening extremist groups. Recent reports highlight a surge in ISIS-affiliated activity in the Lac Chad region, exploiting the instability and leveraging the decline of French influence.
Key Stakeholders and Their Motivations
Several actors are actively shaping the dynamics of the Sahel. France, driven by strategic concerns – maintaining influence in the uranium-rich region and countering Islamist extremism – has sought to retain a significant military footprint, although now operating primarily through a ‘support mission’ rather than direct combat operations. The United States, through the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), aims to bolster regional security capacity and address the root causes of instability, but its efforts have been hampered by bureaucratic delays and a reluctance to directly engage in combat. Within the region, the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, under pressure from escalating violence and facing dwindling international support, have prioritized stability over democratic governance, often exhibiting a transactional approach to foreign policy. Russia, through the Wagner Group, has offered a compelling alternative, providing security services and infrastructure development in exchange for access to natural resources, effectively filling a void left by the withdrawal of Western forces. According “to the Center for Strategic and International Studies,” this approach, however, risks further entrenching authoritarian regimes and undermining long-term security.
Recent Developments (Past Six Months)
Over the past six months, the situation has deteriorated significantly. The collapse of the Gao-Menaka offensive in Mali, spearheaded by the Wagner Group, underscored the vulnerability of even the most fortified positions. Negotiations between the Malian government and certain jihadist groups, mediated by the United Arab Emirates, have yielded limited results, primarily focused on localized ceasefires rather than comprehensive peace agreements. Burkina Faso has experienced a dramatic escalation in violence, with armed groups expanding their control over vast swathes of territory. Niger remains a critical node in the Russian-Wagner strategic alignment, while Chad faces a precarious balance between maintaining stability and addressing widespread grievances. The ongoing maritime insecurity along the Gulf of Guinea, exacerbated by the rise of piracy and armed robbery, further complicates the situation. The African Union’s peacekeeping mission, while providing crucial support, is stretched thin and facing significant logistical challenges.
Future Impact & Insight
Short-term (next 6 months), the most likely scenario involves continued fragmentation and violence. We can expect further territorial gains by extremist groups, a deepening humanitarian crisis, and a further erosion of state authority. The withdrawal of Western forces will likely accelerate this trend, creating opportunities for Russia and other actors to expand their influence. Long-term (5–10 years), the Sahel risks becoming a permanent failed state, with significant implications for regional security and global stability. The proliferation of weapons, the displacement of populations, and the rise of transnational criminal networks will undoubtedly exacerbate existing challenges. A potential scenario involves a regional domino effect, with instability spreading to neighboring countries like Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana.
However, a different trajectory – one of localized stabilization through genuine engagement with local communities, addressing grievances, and promoting economic development – is still possible, but it demands a fundamental shift in Western approach. The current focus on military solutions has proven demonstrably ineffective. Instead, a “whole-of-society” strategy, incorporating elements of good governance, conflict resolution, and sustainable development, is urgently required. The challenge lies not just in securing territory, but in building resilient communities capable of managing their own futures.
Looking ahead, the Sahel’s fate hinges on whether the international community can learn from its past mistakes and adopt a more nuanced and sustainable approach to engagement. A moment of deep reflection is needed – a willingness to acknowledge the profound failures of the past and embrace a strategy grounded in partnership, respect, and a genuine commitment to the aspirations of the Sahel’s people. The dust is settling, but the consequences of inaction will be far more devastating.