The air in Awaza, Turkmenistan, hung heavy with the unspoken anxieties surrounding the Third United Nations Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDC3). Held from August 4th to 8th, 2025, the conference, a critical juncture in the ongoing efforts to improve the economic and logistical challenges faced by nations like Bhutan, Nepal, and Timor-Leste, revealed a growing divergence in priorities amongst key stakeholders. The conference’s central theme – “Driving Progress through Partnerships” – felt increasingly distant from the stark realities of evolving trade routes and a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape. The overall success of the meeting, measured by the commitment to the Awaza Programme of Action for LLDCs (2024–2034), remains questionable given the increasing reluctance of major trading partners to fully address the long-standing issues of transit fees and infrastructure deficits.
The United Nations estimates over 120 countries attended the conference, representing a broad spectrum of interests. However, the discussions highlighted a troubling trend: a decreasing willingness among major economic powers – particularly China and the United States – to significantly alter their trade strategies in response to the LLDCs’ needs. Data released by the World Bank shows that despite the 2024 Programme of Action, the volume of goods passing through traditional LLDC transit routes has, in many cases, declined, a consequence largely attributed to the rise of alternative, more direct shipping lanes circumventing established agreements. This presents a profound challenge to the core mission of LLDC3: facilitating access to global markets.
A significant contributing factor to this shift is the ongoing expansion of the Polar Silk Road, a sea route connecting Asia with Europe via the Arctic. The opening of new Arctic shipping lanes, while offering a potentially faster and cheaper route, has dramatically reduced the reliance on established transit corridors through countries like Turkey and Iran, key transit nations for many LLDCs. “The Arctic has become a focal point for trade, fundamentally altering the dynamics of regional connectivity,” noted Dr. Anya Sharma, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Strategic Studies, during a post-conference briefing. “The traditional models for supporting LLDCs are simply no longer adequate.”
The conference underscored a persistent power imbalance. China, now the world’s largest trading nation, has been notably less vocal about revising transit fees, citing “market forces” and emphasizing its commitment to “win-win cooperation.” Similarly, the United States, grappling with its own infrastructure challenges and trade disputes, offered only limited new pledges. This lack of decisive action directly contradicted the intent of the Awaza Programme of Action, which prioritized increased investment in infrastructure, logistical support, and capacity building.
Further complicating matters was the increasing tension surrounding the control of strategic chokepoints. The Suez Canal remains a vital artery for global trade, but its vulnerability to geopolitical events – as demonstrated by the 2023 blockage – has prompted several nations to explore alternative routes. This, in turn, has intensified competition for influence over key transit hubs, particularly in regions like the Horn of Africa.
A key moment of contention arose during the High-Level Thematic Roundtable 3, focused on “Enhancing Adaptive Capacity, Strengthening Resilience, and Addressing Vulnerability to Climate Change and Disasters in LLDCs.” Representatives from several LLDCs passionately argued for increased funding to bolster climate resilience programs, citing escalating risks from glacial melt, rising sea levels, and increasingly frequent extreme weather events. However, funding commitments were lukewarm, with most contributions remaining at the previously agreed levels.
“We are acutely aware of the existential threats facing our countries,” stated Lyonpo D. N. Dhungyel, Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade of Bhutan, during his closing remarks. “But without genuine commitment to address the underlying structural challenges – specifically the issue of transit costs – the Awaza Programme of Action remains an aspiration rather than a tangible reality.”
Beyond the immediate negotiations, the conference revealed a growing concern within the LLDC community regarding the role of multilateral institutions. Critics argue that the UN’s approach to LLDC development has been overly reliant on voluntary pledges and insufficient in delivering concrete results. “The problem isn’t a lack of goodwill; it’s a fundamental disconnect between pledges and action,” commented Professor Kenji Tanaka, a specialist in international trade at the University of Tokyo. “We need a more legally binding framework, coupled with robust enforcement mechanisms, to truly hold major trading partners accountable.”
Looking ahead, the next six months are likely to see continued efforts to lobby for revised transit fee agreements. However, the prevailing geopolitical climate – characterized by strategic competition and a heightened focus on supply chain security – presents a significant obstacle. Longer-term, the success of the Awaza Programme of Action hinges on the willingness of major powers to fundamentally rethink their trade relationships with LLDCs. The strategic importance of these nations, given their critical position within global supply chains, is only set to increase. The challenge is whether the world will recognize the urgent need for a more equitable and sustainable approach to regional connectivity. The answer, perhaps, lies in a greater acknowledgement of the profound impact of LLDCs on the interconnectedness of the global economy—a reality too often overlooked in the pursuit of short-term strategic gains.