The strategic importance of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the narrow waterway connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, has undergone a dramatic shift over the past decade. Once primarily dominated by Western naval forces, particularly the United States, the area is now witnessing a complex and potentially destabilizing realignment, driven by the expanding maritime presences of India and Turkey, alongside evolving economic and security interests. Recent events, culminating in increased Turkish naval activity and a subtly strengthened Indian maritime footprint, raise serious questions about the future of regional stability and the evolving dynamics of great power competition.
The current situation is rooted in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring and the subsequent rise of non-state actors, principally al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and, more recently, Islamic State Khorasan (ISK). Initial Western intervention, largely through the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), focused on counter-terrorism and maritime security operations within the strait. However, the perceived limitations of this approach, combined with changing geopolitical alignments, created a vacuum that other regional and international actors have sought to fill.
Historically, the Bab-el-Mandeb has been a critical transit point for global trade, accounting for roughly 12% of all seaborne trade. The Suez Canal, a relatively narrow waterway, further elevates its strategic value. The United States, recognizing this, maintained a robust naval presence in the region, utilizing bases in Bahrain and Djibouti, conducting anti-piracy patrols, and supporting local maritime security initiatives. This was largely facilitated by a series of bilateral agreements and through the CMF, a multinational coalition of naval forces.
However, a confluence of factors has eroded this established order. The decline of U.S. influence following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, coupled with a shifting emphasis on other geopolitical priorities, has left a space for other actors to emerge. Turkey, bolstered by its ambitious “Blue Homeland” doctrine – asserting sovereign rights over surrounding maritime spaces – has significantly increased its naval presence in the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb. Turkish naval deployments, initially framed as support for regional security, have increasingly involved exercises and patrols within the strait, prompting concerns from regional partners and observers alike. According to a recent report by the International Crisis Group, “Turkish naval activity… represents a deliberate challenge to the existing maritime security architecture.”
India’s response has been a more cautious, yet equally strategic, realignment. Driven by growing economic ties with countries along the Red Sea coastline, particularly Sudan and Egypt, and a desire to secure critical trade routes, India has steadily increased its naval presence through initiatives like Project Seabird – a dedicated maritime reconnaissance and surveillance platform – and expanded naval exercises with regional partners. Furthermore, India has significantly enhanced its engagement with the Djibouti International Maritime Authority (DIM), a regional organization focused on maritime security in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Data from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) highlights a 78% increase in Indian naval port visits to Red Sea nations over the last five years.
The intensification of Turkish and Indian maritime operations raises several immediate and longer-term concerns. Firstly, the overlapping maritime zones create the potential for confrontation, particularly if competing perceptions of security responsibilities are not effectively managed. Secondly, the increased naval presence has arguably exacerbated the existing security challenges posed by ISKP and other extremist groups operating in the region, potentially disrupting counter-terrorism efforts. A recent analysis by the Brookings Institution identified “a risk of an escalation, should maritime security operations inadvertently lead to clashes or misinterpretations.” Finally, the dynamic represents a significant shift in the balance of power within the Horn of Africa, potentially impacting the regional dynamics of countries like Somalia, Ethiopia, and Yemen.
Looking forward, within the next six months, we can anticipate continued expansion of both Indian and Turkish naval activities in the Bab-el-Mandeb. India is likely to further strengthen its partnerships with Egypt and Sudan, potentially exploring opportunities to establish joint maritime security arrangements. Turkey will likely continue to solidify its position, conducting more frequent naval exercises and potentially deploying additional assets. Simultaneously, ISKP will likely adapt, seeking to exploit the increased maritime activity to launch attacks or disrupt naval operations.
Over the longer term, a 5–10 year horizon reveals a potentially fragmented maritime security landscape. The US influence, already diminished, is unlikely to regain its prominence. The rise of India and Turkey as key maritime actors will shape the regional order, with potential implications for global trade flows and the stability of key strategic waterways. The challenge will be for regional actors and international partners to foster dialogue and establish a framework for cooperation, ensuring that maritime security operations contribute to stability rather than exacerbating existing tensions. The future of the Bab-el-Mandeb hinges on the ability of key players to navigate this complex realignment with prudence and foresight. This requires a sustained effort to build trust, promote transparency, and prioritize shared security interests. The question remains: can regional actors effectively manage this new strategic landscape, or will the Horn’s fracture lead to further instability?