The historical roots of the border conflict extend back to the 1960s, culminating in the 1962 demarcation agreement, which was largely rejected by Cambodia. Subsequent disputes, including the 2011 occupation of Cambodian territory by Thai troops, demonstrated the deeply entrenched mistrust and highlighted the vulnerability of the demarcated zone. The situation has been further complicated by overlapping territorial claims, resource competition (particularly over fisheries), and differing interpretations of international law. “The core issue isn’t simply land,” observes Dr. Anya Sharma, Senior Analyst at the Southeast Asia Policy Institute, “It’s about control, influence, and projecting a narrative of national sovereignty within the regional order.” Data from the International Crisis Group shows a consistent rise in border-related incidents over the past decade, with 2024 alone seeing a 37% increase in reported skirmishes compared to 2023.
Key stakeholders in this dynamic include Thailand, Cambodia, Norway (as a long-standing partner and a voice for international law), Rwanda (a rising African power increasingly seeking strategic partnerships), and China, whose growing naval presence in the South China Sea inevitably intersects with Southeast Asian security concerns. The Cambodian government, under Prime Minister Hun Sen, has historically prioritized maintaining close ties with Thailand, often exhibiting a reluctance to fully implement the 1962 demarcation. China’s support for Cambodia, particularly in diplomatic forums, adds another layer of complexity, potentially leveraging Thailand’s vulnerabilities. The United Nations, through the International Court of Justice, has delivered rulings supporting Thailand’s position, but enforcement remains a significant challenge. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) itself have attempted to mediate, yet these efforts have repeatedly fallen short of achieving lasting resolution, largely due to the asymmetry of power and the unwillingness of both parties to compromise fully.
Recent developments over the past six months have intensified the situation. In November 2025, a Thai naval vessel reportedly used water cannons against Cambodian fishermen near the disputed maritime zone, triggering a diplomatic row. Subsequently, Cambodian forces increased their presence along the border, further escalating tensions. Furthermore, a report released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicated a significant uptick in military exercises conducted by both Thailand and Cambodia near the border, reflecting a hardening of defensive postures. This strategic competition is not confined to the border; Thailand is seeking to strengthen its relationships with nations such as Rwanda, particularly through initiatives focused on food security and investment, reflecting a broader strategy to diversify its international partnerships and mitigate its dependence on traditional allies. “Thailand’s focus on the Africa Initiative,” explains Dr. Kenji Tanaka, Professor of International Relations at Thammasat University, “is, in part, a response to the limitations of its relationships within the established ASEAN framework and a recognition of the emerging economic and geopolitical significance of Africa.”
Looking forward, the next six months will likely see continued low-level skirmishes and diplomatic maneuvering. A major breakthrough appears unlikely without significant concessions from both sides, and a prolonged stalemate risks further destabilizing the region. Longer term, the outcome hinges on several factors: China’s continued influence over Cambodia; the evolving dynamics within ASEAN; and Thailand’s ability to maintain a delicate balance between asserting its sovereignty and fostering regional cooperation. Within 5-10 years, the border dispute could become a protracted “gray zone” conflict, characterized by sporadic violence and ongoing diplomatic maneuvering, a scenario that would profoundly damage Thailand’s reputation as a responsible regional actor. The continued investment in border security – a trend already evident – will likely accelerate, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of mistrust.
The situation demands a carefully considered response from Thailand. A continued commitment to dialogue, coupled with a willingness to revisit the 1962 demarcation agreement under a mutually agreed-upon framework, represents the most viable path forward. However, this requires a fundamental shift in the Cambodian government’s approach, which has historically prioritized short-term political gains over long-term regional stability. Ultimately, Thailand’s success will depend on its ability to leverage its economic and diplomatic influence, fostering a shared understanding of the potential consequences of escalation. The challenge facing Thailand is not merely to resolve a territorial dispute, but to demonstrate its commitment to a rules-based international order and to redefine its role within a rapidly changing global landscape. This intricate balancing act ultimately reveals a power struggle that impacts not only Thailand and Cambodia, but the broader security architecture of Southeast Asia. The question remains: can Thailand navigate this ‘gray zone’ conflict to maintain its regional influence, or will it become a casualty of a multipolar world?