Historically, Korean engagement with Southeast Asia has been rooted in a “Look East” policy, initially focused on economic opportunities following the Asian financial crisis of 1997. This evolved over time, with South Korea recognizing the strategic importance of a stable and prosperous ASEAN as a counterweight to China’s rising influence. The 2019 CSP represented a formalized commitment to this long-term strategy, formalized by the Plan of Action (2026-2030) which included key initiatives such as AKFTA upgrades and the Digital Economy Framework Agreement. Prior to December 2024, the ROK, under President Park Jin-su, had maintained a relatively consistent approach, prioritizing economic cooperation alongside robust diplomatic support for ASEAN’s efforts to navigate complex territorial disputes, particularly concerning the South China Sea.
“The ROK’s approach to ASEAN has been fundamentally pragmatic, focused on mutually beneficial engagement and seeking to leverage ASEAN’s centrality within the regional architecture,” stated Dr. Lee Jae-hyun, Senior Fellow at the Korea Institute of International Studies, in a recent interview. “However, the current geopolitical climate has introduced a significant degree of uncertainty, forcing a recalibration of that approach.” Data from the ASEAN Investment Forum indicates a 17% decrease in Korean direct investment into ASEAN member states in Q3 2025, attributed to increased security risk assessments and a shift in Korean corporate investment priorities toward more stable, Western markets.
Key Stakeholders: The ROK government, under President Park Jin-su, is heavily invested in securing a stable and predictable trade environment within ASEAN, particularly given its reliance on regional trade agreements for economic growth. Thailand, as Country Coordinator, faces the challenge of balancing its own economic interests with the diverse and sometimes conflicting priorities of ASEAN member states. The ASEAN Secretariat, while facilitating dialogue, lacks the formal authority to enforce compliance or mediate disputes effectively. China’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea represents the most significant external threat – complicating ROK investment decisions and contributing to heightened regional security concerns. Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines have been particularly vocal in their calls for stronger collective action to address Chinese maritime activities, potentially fracturing the consensus on approaches to regional security issues.
Recent developments further underscore this instability. Negotiations on the AKFTA Upgrade have stalled significantly, with disagreements emerging regarding the level of tariff reductions and the inclusion of intellectual property rights protections. Furthermore, South Korea’s decision to bolster its military presence in the Yellow Sea, ostensibly for defensive purposes, has been interpreted by some ASEAN nations as a signal of increased strategic alignment with the United States, potentially undermining the non-aligned character of the CSP. “The ROK’s actions are viewed with suspicion by some ASEAN members who prioritize maintaining a neutral stance in the US-China rivalry,” commented Dr. Somchai Suksri, a political analyst at Chulalongkorn University, in a December 2025 report. “The potential for the CSP to become a tool for projecting Korean influence risks eroding trust and ultimately undermining the alliance’s coherence.”
Looking ahead, the next six months will likely see continued turbulence in the AKFTA negotiations and increased efforts by the ROK to secure firm commitments from ASEAN member states regarding security cooperation. Long-term, the CSP’s success hinges on the ability of all parties to adapt to the evolving geopolitical landscape. The potential for a protracted trade war between the US and China – a scenario increasingly viewed as probable – could fundamentally reshape the dynamics of the ASEAN-ROK partnership, forcing a renewed focus on economic resilience and diversification. By 2030, the success of the CSP will be judged not solely on trade volumes but on its ability to provide a stable and reliable economic partnership within a highly volatile region. The ability of Thailand, as Country Coordinator, to successfully broker compromises and manage competing interests will be a defining measure of the alliance’s future. The challenge remains: Can the fractured consensus be repaired, or will the ASEAN-ROK partnership become another casualty of great-power competition?