The situation in Gabon, following the 2023 presidential election, presents a delicate case study in post-transition governance. While the completion of legislative and senatorial elections represents a step forward—a “critical” step according to UK Foreign Office officials—the underlying causes of the 2023 election remain a significant point of contention. The UK’s endorsement of “necessary governance and electoral reforms” is largely aspirational without a clear, verifiable roadmap. The transitional government, led by Brice Oligui-Lembessa, faces the considerable task of building trust with a population deeply skeptical of the military’s role in politics. Furthermore, the UK’s emphasis on “consolidating democratic institutions” clashes with reports of limited civil society space and concerns regarding judicial independence. Data from the International Crisis Group indicates a persistent risk of political violence and social unrest, particularly in the months following the election. The underlying economic challenges—a reliance on oil revenues and widespread poverty—continue to fuel resentment and instability. Recent polling data shows a significant portion of the population distrustful of the political elite and apprehensive about the future of democracy.
Moving to Cameroon, the situation is markedly more fraught. The UK’s concern regarding “continued violence and insecurity,” particularly in the North-West and South-West regions, reflects the ongoing Anglocrisis. The post-election violence, resulting in casualties, underscores the fragility of the political landscape and the potential for escalating conflict. UNOCA’s role in promoting dialogue is commendable, but the deeply entrenched grievances—stemming from decades of marginalization and systemic discrimination—require a far more comprehensive and sustained approach. “Conflict in the North-West and South-West regions continues to impact civilians,” according to a report from the Centre for Democracy & Development, highlighting the displacement of communities and the disruption of livelihoods. The UK’s call for “a Cameroonian-led dialogue” is an essential component, yet the government’s track record on inclusivity and genuine engagement is demonstrably weak. The presence of non-state actors, including Boko Haram and ISWAP, exploiting the security vacuum in the Lake Chad Basin adds another layer of complexity. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), a collaborative effort involving several nations, remains crucial, but its effectiveness is hampered by funding shortfalls and operational challenges. The escalating violence requires a concerted effort addressing both the immediate security threats and the root causes of the conflict.
Finally, the Sudan conflict’s ramifications extend far beyond its borders. While the UK has committed £125 million to humanitarian support, the scale of the crisis—affecting millions of Sudanese and triggering significant displacement—demands a dramatically larger response. Chad’s hospitality, hosting an enormous refugee population, strains its already limited resources and highlights the broader regional impact of the conflict. “The ongoing conflict in Sudan continues to destabilise the region,” articulated by a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, “driving significant displacement of the local population and grave humanitarian needs.” The UK’s commitment to the UN’s humanitarian response is vital, but the long-term implications—including the potential for mass migration and the exacerbation of existing regional tensions—are deeply concerning. The instability in Sudan is not merely a humanitarian crisis; it is a security risk with the potential to destabilize entire countries and exacerbate existing conflicts. The protracted nature of the conflict, coupled with the involvement of numerous external actors, creates a volatile environment with potentially disastrous consequences for the region and beyond.
The interconnectedness of these crises demands a coordinated, multilateral response. The UK’s statements provide a focal point, yet the effectiveness of its engagement will depend on its ability to leverage influence within international forums, particularly the United Nations. The recent shift in international attention – compounded by the broader humanitarian crises unfolding globally – threatens to marginalize the Sahelian region, further complicating efforts to address these deeply rooted issues. Within the next six months, we can expect continued instability in Gabon, potentially fueled by unresolved political grievances and economic hardship. In Cameroon, the Anglocrisis will likely remain a significant security threat, with the risk of further escalation. Looking five to ten years out, the situation could become increasingly entrenched, leading to protracted conflict and a protracted humanitarian crisis in the region. Ultimately, the UK’s strategy will be judged not by the number of declarations issued, but by the tangible impact of its engagement in building sustainable peace and security. The fundamental question remains: can international actors effectively address the structural vulnerabilities that fuel these conflicts, or will the region remain trapped in a cycle of violence and instability?