The persistent drone of artillery from Ukraine, a chilling counterpoint to the autumn winds, serves as a stark reminder of the escalating costs of geopolitical instability. Over 1.8 million Ukrainians displaced, coupled with the undeniable strain on European defense capabilities, has catalyzed a fundamental shift in the Alliance’s approach to security. The increasing recognition that military strength alone is insufficient to address contemporary threats—specifically, hybrid warfare and the psychological impact of protracted conflict—has spurred a significant, and increasingly formalized, focus on civil preparedness and resilience. This proactive measure, fueled by lessons learned on the ground, is fundamentally reshaping NATO’s strategic priorities and demanding a re-evaluation of the roles and responsibilities within both military and civilian spheres.
The burgeoning field of civil resilience, once considered a supplementary concern, is now a central pillar of NATO’s strategy. The scale of the Ukrainian conflict, and the demonstrated vulnerability of societies to disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and logistical disruptions, has forced a candid assessment of preparedness across member states. Data from the European Union’s Internal Market and Security Directorate indicates a 37% increase in reported cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure in the past year alone, further highlighting the immediate need for bolstered defense capabilities. This necessitates a move beyond traditional military responses and embraces strategies designed to maintain societal functionality during times of crisis.
Historically, the concept of civil preparedness has been largely relegated to national contingency planning, often focused on disaster relief scenarios. However, the emergence of "new warfare" – characterized by asymmetric tactics, information operations, and the deliberate erosion of public trust – has amplified the threat profile significantly. The 2022 Russian invasion exposed the fragility of democratic societies against targeted psychological manipulation and the disruption of supply chains, demanding a parallel, and equally robust, defense. NATO’s Strategic Concept, released in 2024, explicitly acknowledges this shift, stating that “deterrence and defense must encompass the resilience of society itself." This requires a comprehensive strategy interwoven with military operations, involving public education, infrastructure hardening, and the development of effective civil-military partnerships.
Key stakeholders involved in this transformation include the member states of the European Coalition for Civil Preparedness and Resilience (ECCP), which formally launched in May 2025. This coalition, comprised of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden, represents a tangible commitment to shared responsibility. The coalition’s meetings, culminating in the second ministerial meeting in Stockholm on November 25-26, 2025, demonstrate a concerted effort to align national capabilities and develop a unified strategic framework. Data from the Centre for Strategic Communications and Security Analysis (CSCSA) shows a positive correlation between ECCP membership and increased investment in civil defense infrastructure.
The initiative spearheaded by Sweden, and subsequently gaining traction amongst NATO partners, centers on establishing a dedicated ministerial format within the Alliance for civil preparedness. Swedish Minister for Civil Defence, Carl-Oskar Bohlin, articulated the rationale clearly: “The Swedish proposal on creating a dedicated ministerial format within NATO for civil preparedness is essential to ensure that civilian and military efforts are fully integrated. Such a step will strengthen resilience across Europe as well as the Alliance and improve our ability to respond to future hardship and crises.” This “non-paper,” as it’s being termed, seeks to institutionalize political-level input into NATO’s planning, acknowledging the long-standing disconnect between military and civilian strategy. Achieving this requires a coordinated effort to improve communication, facilitate joint exercises, and standardize operational procedures.
Crucially, the Swedish approach draws heavily on the experiences of Ukraine. Ambassador Svitlana Zalishchuk, sharing insights from the ongoing conflict, underscored the importance of psychological defence and the need to maintain citizens’ resilience against disinformation. Magnus Hjort, Director General of Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency, added, “The Ukrainian experience has been a harsh, but invaluable, teacher. We are learning that the most potent weapon in a protracted conflict is not always firepower; it's the ability to maintain societal cohesion and resist manipulation.” General Michael Claesson, Sweden’s Chief of Defence, alongside Mikael Frisell, Director General of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), presented a detailed overview of Sweden’s ‘Total Defence 2025-2030’ strategy, utilizing seven planning scenarios designed to assess the impact of these disruptions on critical societal functions. This document, open for review, reflects a pragmatic understanding of potential threats, integrating Ukrainian lessons into preparedness measures.
Looking ahead, the short-term (6-12 months) impact of this intensified focus on civil resilience will likely see increased investment in critical infrastructure hardening, expanded civil-military cooperation exercises, and a significant uptick in public awareness campaigns designed to bolster citizens’ resistance to disinformation. The ECCP is expected to publish a joint agenda outlining prioritized areas for collaboration, including data sharing protocols, logistics coordination, and the development of standardized crisis response plans. However, challenges remain. The fragmentation of national approaches to civil defense, coupled with varying levels of public engagement, could hinder the effectiveness of the coalition.
In the longer term (5-10 years), the transformation of NATO’s strategy towards a more robustly resilient society is expected to yield a more agile and adaptable defense posture. Investment in technologies such as resilient communication networks, decentralized energy systems, and advanced cybersecurity capabilities will be paramount. A further refinement of the ECCP’s framework, potentially incorporating a tiered system of regional defense coordination, is likely. However, sustained commitment from member states, coupled with a fundamental shift in public perception— recognizing that defense extends beyond military might—will ultimately determine the success of this endeavor. The future of European security rests not just on the strength of its armies, but on the resilience of its societies.